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Abstract 
We examine the effect of foreign institutional investors on firm innovation. Using firm-level data 
across 26 non-U.S. economies between 2000 and 2010, we show that foreign institutional 
ownership has a positive, causal effect on firm innovation. We further explore three possible 
underlying mechanisms through which foreign institutions affect firm innovation: foreign 
institutions act as active monitors, provide insurance for firm managers against innovation 
failures, and promote knowledge spillovers from high-innovation economies. Our paper sheds 
new light on the real effects of foreign institutions on firm innovation. 
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I. Introduction  
Technological innovation determines a country’s long-term economic growth (Solow 
(1957)). Despite various efforts to promote innovation, it remains a significant challenge for 
firms in economies outside the United States to engage in innovative activities.1 Existing 
literature shows that firms’ obstacles to innovation are often formed internally according to the 
country’s culture and institutional environments (e.g., Acharya and Subramanian (2009), Brown, 
Martinsson, and Petersen (2013), Hsu et al. (2014), and Xie, Zhang, and Zhang (2016)).2 In this 
study, we propose an external solution to overcome local firms’ innovation constraints: foreign 
institutional investors. We investigate how foreign institutional investors affect firm innovation 
in non-U.S. economies.  
We hypothesize that foreign institutional investors are able to enhance firm innovation. 
This conjecture is motivated by Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales’s (2013) findings that 
institutional investors promote innovation in U.S. firms. Foreign institutional investors not only 
share common characteristics of financial institutions, but also possess unique features that are 
different from domestic institutional investors. Specifically, foreign institutions are credited with 
their independence from local management, with holding internationally diversified portfolios, 
and with expertise in monitoring firms (e.g., Gillan and Starks (2003), Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2000)). According to FactSet, foreign institutional ownership accounts for about 50% of total 
                                                            
1 See Hsu, Tian, and Xu (2014) and Chang, McLean, Zhang, and Zhang (2015) for a stylized distribution of 
innovation output around the world. 
2 According to Carayannis, Samara, and Bakouros ((2015), p. 73), “in only a few cases the basic barriers 
are the scientific or technological problems. Usually, organizational, administrative, and institutional problems get in 
the way.” Chen, Leung, and Evans (2016) find that a firm’s treatment of its employees affects innovation. 
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institutional ownership in non-U.S. firms, which is substantially different from that in the United 
States.3 As an important force in non-U.S. economies, we expect that foreign institutions 
promote firms’ innovation activities and strategies for at least three reasons.4 
First, when the market cannot observe the full spectrum of managerial actions, moral 
hazard could induce managers to shirk and avoid investment in risky and costly innovative 
projects (Hart (1983), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)). Even worse, managers could divert 
firms’ resources for their own private benefit and retain less capital for investment in innovative 
projects. Throughout this corporate capital-allocation process, institutional investors can act as 
corporate monitors and actively intervene to create firm value (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
Kahn and Winton (1998), Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), and Gillan and Starks (2003)). 
Specifically, Gillan and Starks (2003) argue that, due to their independent positions and a lack of 
conflicts of interest, foreign institutional investors play a more important role in corporate 
                                                            
3 The ownership structure of U.S. firms is different from that of non-U.S. firms in the sense that foreign 
institutional ownership of U.S. firms accounts for just a negligible proportion of total equity ownership. For 
example, according to FactSet, foreign institutional investors hold merely 1.8% while domestic institutions own as 
much as 38.4% for an average U.S. firm during the 2000–2010 period. To the best of our knowledge, the impact of 
institutional investors outside the United States, especially that of foreign institutions, on firm innovation is still 
largely unanswered in the literature. 
4 A famous recent anecdote supports the innovation-enhancing role of foreign institutional investors. 
Alibaba, a Chinese e-commerce company, raised $25 billion in Sept. 19, 2014, which is the world’s largest initial 
public offering (IPO). Alibaba is regarded as one of the most innovative companies in China. Before Alibaba’s IPO, 
it was financed by SoftBank (a Japanese investment company) and Yahoo (a U.S. technology firm) who later 
became Alibaba’s largest and second largest shareholder, respectively. Due to Alibaba’s IPO success in the United 
States, a question is frequently raised by the Chinese public and regulators: why are innovative Chinese firms 
typically financed by foreign institutions? 
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governance than domestic peers. This statement is further supported by Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, 
and Matos’s (2011) finding that foreign institutional investors are proactively involved in 
monitoring investee firms worldwide. Therefore, we expect that intensive monitoring by foreign 
institutions can induce managers to invest in long-term, value-enhancing innovative activities. 
We call this view the monitoring channel.  
Second, optimal incentive contracts that motivate innovation should exhibit substantial 
tolerance for early failure and reward for long-term success (e.g., Manso (2011), Ederer and 
Manso (2013)). Aghion et al. (2013) state that if incentive contracts cannot fully motivate 
innovation, institutional investors could step in to alleviate managers’ career or reputational 
concerns by providing them with insurance against early failures of their innovative activities. 
Compared with domestic peers, foreign institutional investors hold internationally diversified 
portfolios, and thus should have a greater ability to tolerate the failure risk of investing in 
innovative projects. Therefore, they are more likely to insulate managers from punishment for 
innovation failures. We expect that the tolerance for failure by foreign institutions would 
encourage firm innovation. We term this view the insurance channel. 
Third, investments in knowledge creation by one party create positive externalities in 
innovation on the other parties (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Fogarty (2000)).5 Foreign institutions 
could facilitate knowledge spillovers through business networks.6 For example, anecdotal 
                                                            
5 There are a number of factors that affect knowledge spillovers, such as the mobility of highly skilled 
human capital (Agrawal, Cockburn, and McHale (2006)), international trade and foreign direct investment 
(Branstetter (2006)), and geographic location (Keller (2002)). 
6 Networks create value by synthesizing information and knowledge, exploiting expertise and pooling 
resources across traditional boundaries to create new knowledge and achieve innovations outside of individual 
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evidence shows that foreign institutions can act as a bridge for networks of managers, investors, 
and other stakeholders of foreign and domestic firms to exchange opportunities and knowledge.7 
Moreover, given that foreign institutional investors promote cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2010)), these cross-border investments could facilitate 
knowledge spillovers and further contribute to local firms’ innovation activities (e.g., Guadalupe, 
Kuzmina, and Thomas (2012)). Taken together, foreign institutions could enhance knowledge 
spillovers across countries through promoting business networks and cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, which could contribute to the success of innovation activities in investee firms. We 
call this view the knowledge spillover channel.  
We test our hypothesis using data from 26 non-U.S. economies for the 2000–2010 period. 
The data are from a unique international database of firm-level patents and citations, the Derwent 
World Patents Index (DWPI) compiled by Thomson Reuters. The existing cross-country studies 
on innovation typically use either research and development (R&D) expenditures from the 
Worldscope database or the number of patents granted by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) as innovation measures. These measures, however, have some 
limitations.8 Our innovation measures based on patents granted by both domestic and foreign 
                                                            
capabilities and resource bases of individual organizations (Johnson, Heimann, and O’Neill (2001), Pawar and 
Sharifi (2000), Prasad and Akhilesh (2002), Ratcheva and Vyakarnam (2001),  and Trott (2008)). 
7 For example, the chief executive officer (CEO) of BlackRock, a leading U.S. investment management 
company with investments in over 100 countries and offices in 30 countries including India, offered to host a global 
investors meeting in India in early 2015.  
8 We discuss the limitations of existing innovation measures used in cross-country studies in greater detail 
in Section II.  
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patent offices are complementary to the use of R&D investments in measuring innovative 
activities.  
Our baseline results show a positive relation between foreign institutional ownership and 
firm innovation output, consistent with our hypothesis. Specifically, an increase in foreign 
institutional ownership from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile is associated with a 5.6% 
increase in patent counts and a 7.8% increase in patent citations in the following year. This result 
is economically significant. 
Although the above evidence supports our hypothesis, an important concern is that the 
relation between foreign institutions and firm innovation could be endogenously determined. 
Specifically, the result could be biased by unobservable firm and country characteristics that are 
correlated with both foreign institutional ownership and firm innovation (i.e., the omitted 
variable concern), or by the possibility that firms with greater innovation potential attract more 
foreign institutional investors (i.e., the reverse causality concern). As a result, a positive 
association between foreign institutional ownership and firm innovation does not necessarily 
imply that foreign institutions increase firm innovation. To address these endogeneity concerns, 
we use 2 different identification strategies.  
Our first identification strategy is to use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach that 
relies on plausibly exogenous variation in foreign institutional ownership generated by a quasi-
natural experiment: the passage of the U.S. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
(JGTRRA) of 2003. The JGTRRA was designed to lower dividend tax rates not only for U.S. 
firms but also for firms domiciled in foreign countries that have tax treaties with the United 
States. Dividend-paying stocks in treaty countries thus become more attractive to U.S. 
institutional investors after the passage of the JGTRRA. If U.S. institutions tilt their portfolio 
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allocations to dividend-paying stocks in treaty countries following the passage of the JGTRRA, 
the event would create plausibly exogenous variation in U.S. foreign institutional ownership in 
non-U.S. firms. After undertaking a number of diagnostic tests to ensure the satisfaction of the 
parallel trend assumption, the key identifying assumption of the DID approach, we find that 
firms with an increase in U.S. foreign institutional ownership generate a larger number of patents 
and citations than those that do not experience an increase in U.S. foreign institutional ownership 
surrounding the enactment of the JGTRRA.  
Our second identification strategy is based on an instrumental variable (IV) approach. We 
follow Aggarwal et al. (2011) and use the time-varying membership of the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI) All Country World Index between 2000 and 2010 as an 
instrumental variable for foreign institutional ownership. According to MSCI Inc., the MSCI is 
the industry’s accepted gauge of global stock market activity and is a commonly used benchmark 
index for foreign institutional investors. Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Leuz, Lins, and Warnock 
(2010) find that the MSCI membership increases a firm’s probability of attracting foreign capital. 
More importantly, it is reasonable to believe that the inclusion of the MSCI membership is less 
likely to depend on a firm’s innovation output. Our IV approach analysis continues to find a 
positive effect of foreign institutional ownership on firm innovation.  
 We next examine three plausible underlying economic mechanisms through which 
foreign institutions enhance firm innovation. First, to test the monitoring channel, we classify 
foreign institutional investors into independent and grey investors, as well as long-term and 
short-term investors. Compared with grey (or short-term) foreign institutions, independent (or 
long-term) foreign institutions are regarded as active monitors, who play a more important role 
in governing firms (e.g., Chen, Harford, and Li (2007)). Consistent with our conjecture, we find 
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that only independent (or long-term) foreign institutions enhance firm innovation, while grey (or 
short-term) foreign institutions do not. Our evidence suggests that foreign institutional investors 
promote innovation through their active monitoring of firms.  
Second, we explore the insurance channel. We find that the sensitivity of CEO turnover 
(or compensation) to performance is lower in firms with greater foreign institutional ownership. 
According to Manso (2011), a high sensitivity of CEO turnover (or compensation) to 
performance is detrimental to motivating firm innovation because these incentive contracts are 
intolerant of failure. Thus, this finding suggests that by providing insurance (against failure risk) 
to managers with career and reputational concerns, foreign institutional investors allow managers 
to focus more on long-term, risky investment in innovative projects and hence positively 
contribute to their investee firms’ innovation output.  
Finally, we examine the knowledge spillover channel. To the extent that foreign 
institutions could act as a bridge that facilitates knowledge spillovers from their home countries 
to investee countries, we expect foreign institutions from more innovative countries to play a 
greater role in promoting investee firms’ innovation than those from less innovative countries. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the positive effect of foreign institutional ownership 
on firm innovation is largely driven by institutions from foreign countries with a high innovation 
level.  
Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, our paper is related to the 
literature on the economic impacts of foreign institutions. Existing evidence shows that foreign 
institutional ownership affects firm value and performance (Ferreira and Matos (2008)), 
promotes improvements in governance (Aggarwal et al. (2011)), and facilitates the global 
convergence of financial reporting practices (Fang, Maffett, and Zhang (2015)). In addition, 
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foreign ownership, in the aftermath of financial liberalization, affects the cost of capital (Bekaert 
and Harvey (2000), Lau, Ng, and Zhang (2010)), real wages (Chari, Henry, and Sasson (2012)), 
consumption growth volatility (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006)), emerging equity market 
volatility (Bekaert and Harvey (1997)), and stock market liquidity (Ng, Wu, Yu, and Zhang 
(2016)). Our study documents the positive role of foreign institutional ownership in promoting 
technological innovation. Our evidence is consistent with the findings of a contemporaneous 
paper, Bena, Ferreira, Matos, and Pires (2017). Using a set of metrics such as tangible assets, 
intangible assets, human capital, and innovation output, they show that foreign institutional 
ownership fosters long-term investment. Our paper differs from theirs by providing extensive 
evidence on firm innovation and by exploring possible underlying economic mechanisms 
through which foreign institutional investors enhance innovation.  
Second, our paper contributes to the emerging literature on finance and innovation by 
investigating an important driver of innovation outside the United States. There is a fast growing 
body of literature that examines, both theoretically and empirically, various ways to promote 
innovation. Manso (2011) shows that managerial contracts that tolerate failure in the short run 
and reward success in the long run are best at motivating innovation. Empirical evidence shows 
that laws (Acharya and Subramanian (2009), Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014)), 
financial market development (Hsu et al. (2014)), firm boundaries (Seru (2014)), stock liquidity 
(Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014)), market conditions (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013)), financial 
analysts (He and Tian (2013)), banking competition (Cornaggia, Mao, Tian, and Wolfe (2015)), 
labor unions (Bradley, Kim, and Tian (2017)), product market competition (Aghion, Bloom, 
Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005)), and corporate venture capital investors (Chemmanur, 
Loutskina, and Tian (2014)) all alter agents’ incentives and affect innovation. However, there is 
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little insight into the causal effect of foreign institutional investors. We fill in this gap by 
showing that foreign institutional investors are an important driver of firm innovation, 
particularly in less innovative economies.  
Our study complements the work of Aghion et al. (2013). In their model, institutional 
investors are assumed to affect stock prices through either the threat of exit or voice. Using a 
sample of U.S. firms, Aghion et al. (2013) show that institutional investors enhance firm 
innovation, which is consistent with the predictions of their model. Because the key assumptions 
of Aghion et al.’s (2013) model apply to an international setting, we expect institutional investors 
to have the same positive effect on firm innovation in non-U.S. countries.  
Moreover, existing literature shows that, compared with domestic institutions, foreign 
institutions are more likely to use their threat of exit and voice as disciplinary mechanisms. For 
example, Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) find that foreign institutional investors in Japan use 
both exit and voice to send clear messages to management about their interests. In more general 
studies, Gillan and Starks (2003) argue that, due to their independent positions and a lack of 
conflicts of interest, foreign institutions play a crucial role in promoting governance changes in 
local firms. Aggarwal et al. (2011) find that foreign institutional investors engage in monitoring 
investee firms worldwide, which results in higher operating performance and firm value.  
Thus, in the spirit of Aghion et al. (2013), we argue that, through the monitoring channel 
as well as the insurance channel, foreign institutional investors would contribute positively to 
firm innovation. Our study also explores a new underlying channel, unique to foreign 
institutions, which facilitates knowledge spillovers from more to less innovative countries. Taken 
together, our study complements the work of Aghion et al. (2013) by documenting the positive 
effect of foreign institutional ownership on firm innovation.  
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the data and the variable 
construction. Section III presents our baseline results. Section IV addresses identification issues. 
Section V explores plausible underlying mechanisms. Section VI concludes. 
II. Data, Variable Construction, and Descriptive Statistics 
A. Data  
 Our sample includes publicly listed firms from 26 economies (excluding the United 
States) for the 2000–2010 period. We construct firm-level patent and citation variables based on 
the DWPI database compiled by Thomson Reuters. The DWPI is a comprehensive collection of 
global patent information in English, translated from over 30 languages. For example, in 2013, 
the DWPI contains patent data from 48 patenting authorities, covering 51 million patent 
documents and 23 million patent families across all innovation technologies.  
  We obtain institutional ownership data from the FactSet database, a leading source of 
global institutional ownership information. For non-U.S. firms, FactSet collects ownership data 
directly from sources such as national regulatory agencies, stock exchange announcements (e.g., 
the Regulatory News Service in the United Kingdom), local and offshore mutual funds, mutual 
fund industry directories (e.g., European Fund Industry Directory), and company proxies and 
financial reports. Because the FactSet historical ownership data are available from 1999 only, 
our sample period starts from 2000 and ends in 2010. We obtain firm accounting data from the 
Worldscope database.  
To combine innovation, ownership, and accounting information from various databases, 
we match the DWPI’s standardized assignee names with the names of public firms in 
Worldscope. We follow this procedure because the DWPI only provides firm names, and not 
stock identifiers. Following procedures specified on the National Bureau of Economic Research 
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(NBER) patent database’s website, we start with all DWPI patents, as well as the universe of 
firms from Worldscope that have firm names and non-missing SEDOL codes (SEDOL, which 
stands for Stock Exchange Daily Official List, is a 7-digit security identifier assigned by the 
London Stock Exchange).9 We use both exact and fuzzy matching methods to match the DWPI’s 
assignee names with those from Worldscope. To eliminate any lingering doubt in the data-
matching process, we manually search for information about sample firms from different 
newswire services and Internet sources. In this process, we require a firm to have valid 
innovation and accounting information to be included in the sample. Finally, we require an 
economy to have at least 10 firms to be retained in the sample. Our final sample covers 4,249 
unique non-U.S. firms from 26 economies (with a total of 30,008 firm-year observations), of 
which 1,506 firms are located in emerging economies and 2,743 firms in developed economies.  
B. Variable Construction 
1. Firm-Level Innovation Variables 
 Due to the lack of global patent data, prior studies either construct innovation measures 
based on R&D expenditures from Worldscope or use patents applied for through the USPTO as a 
proxy for a firm’s total innovation output (e.g., Hsu et al. (2014)). According to the National 
Research Council, although R&D expenditures are an important input of innovation process, 
they cannot adequately substitute for the innovation output 
(https://www.nap.edu/read/18606/chapter/6). First, many firms do not report R&D expenditures 
in their financial statements due to differences in accounting standards among countries. 
                                                            
9 For detailed information about the NBER patent and citation data cleaning and matching procedures, see 
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/posts/namestandardizationroutinesuploaded. 
14 
 
However, missing R&D information does not necessarily mean that firms are not involved in 
innovative activities (Koh and Reeb (2015)).  
Second, not all R&D investments lead to patent granting because only successful or 
significant innovation is patentable. According to the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), “the invention must consist of patentable subject matter, the invention must be 
industrially applicable (useful), it must be new (novel), it must exhibit a sufficient “inventive 
step” (be nonobvious), and the disclosure of the invention in the patent application must meet 
certain standards” (http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/iprm/pdf/ch2.pdf). Our 
use of patents, a measure of innovation output or successful patent applications, captures an 
important dimension of innovation and thus is complementary to the use of R&D investments in 
measuring innovative activities. 
Third, many non-U.S. firms may not apply for patents to the USPTO, which results in an 
underestimation of innovation output using only U.S. patents as a proxy for non-U.S. firms’ total 
innovation output.10 Comparing the USPTO with the DWPI, we find that the latter compiles 
more patents than the former, especially for innovative economies. For example, in Japan, there 
are a total of 212,034 (285,283) patents filed by Japanese firms in the USPTO (DWPI), which 
                                                            
10 There are two plausible reasons why many non-U.S. firms do not apply for patents through the USPTO. 
First, these non-U.S. firms may not do business in the United States. According to the U.S. patent law, patents filed 
to the USPTO are protected in the United States but not in other countries. As a result, firms that do not do business 
in the United States and hence do not need their intellectual property to be protected in the United States do not 
apply for patents through the USPTO. Second, “home-bias” in patenting due to patent policy familiarity and 
geographical distance could be another reason. Chang et al. (2015) find that about 39.1% of the patents owned by 
firms are awarded within a firm’s home country and 76.3% of non-U.S. patents are filed in patent offices outside the 
United States.  
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suggests that about 25% of Japanese patents in the DWPI are not covered in the USPTO. 
Regarding Germany, there are a total of 29,484 (35,528) patents from the USPTO (DWPI), 
which suggests that about 17% of awarded patents of German firms covered in the DWPI are not 
from the USPTO. We observe similar patterns in other economies such as Korea and Taiwan.11 
The DWPI database contains information on all patents applied for through patent offices around 
the world. Therefore, we are able to construct more accurate measures for non-U.S. firm 
innovation using this database. From the DWPI database we obtain information on patent 
assignee names, application numbers, application dates, application countries, the number of 
future citations received by each patent, patent grant dates, and grant countries.  
We construct 2 measures to capture firm innovation. The first one is a firm’s total number 
of patent applications that are eventually granted in a given year; this measure captures a firm’s 
innovation quantity. We use a patent’s application year instead of its grant year because the 
former is superior when capturing the actual time of innovation (Griliches, Pakes, and Hall 
(1988)). To account for the fact that a patent can be assigned to multiple assignees in the DWPI 
database, we scale a patent by the number of assignees that own the patent, assuming equal 
patent ownership. Because a patent may belong to more than one technology group, we further 
scale this measure by the mean number of patent applications filed in a year for technology 
groups to which the patent belongs. The DWPI database classifies all patents into 3 broad 
categories (chemical, engineering, and electronic and electrical engineering), which are further 
divided into 20 broad subject areas (see Appendix A for details). We use these 20 patent groups 
to normalize our first innovation measure.  
                                                            
11 Of course, for studies focusing on U.S. firms, the USPTO database has its own comparative advantage 
because its patenting policy and patent application and granting procedures are all standardized. 
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The second measure is the total number of citations received by each patent in subsequent 
years, scaled by the average citation count received by each patent for the technology group of 
patents to which the patent of interest belongs. This measure is better for assessing the quality of 
a patent because it captures the economic value of innovation by distinguishing breakthrough 
innovation from incremental discoveries.  
 We address several concerns regarding the innovation variables calculated based on the 
DWPI data set. The first one is the truncation problem caused by the fact that patents appear in 
the database only after they are granted. Because the lag between a patent’s application year and 
its grant year is significant (about 2 years on average), many patent applications were still under 
review and had not been granted by 2015 (when we retrieved the data). To adjust the truncation 
bias in patent counts, we end our study period in 2010, which allows 5 more years for patents 
under review to be granted. Another truncation problem is related to patent citations. Patents 
keep receiving citations over a long period (e.g., 60 years) but we only observe citations received 
up to 2015. Following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), we address the truncation bias in 
citation counts by scaling the number of citation counts by the mean citation counts of the patent 
in the technology groups to which the patent belongs. 
Second, we avoid the double counting problem, that is, a firm may submit patent 
applications to and be granted patents by more than one patenting authority based on the same 
invention. The DWPI database allows us to retrieve patents that are based on the same invention 
and are granted by all patenting authorities. For the same invention’s patents, we keep the record 
of the earliest grant date and count the number of unique patents.  
The third issue is the right skewness of the distribution of patent grants and future 
citations in our sample with its median at 0. This observation is similar to what has been 
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documented in the innovation literature (e.g., Acharya et al. (2014), Seru (2014), and Tian and 
Wang (2014)). To address the right skewness of patent and citation count distributions, we 
winsorize these two variables at the 99th percentile and then use the natural logarithms of patents 
and citations as our main innovation measures. To avoid losing firm-year observations with 0 
patents or citations, we add 1 to the actual patent values before taking the natural logarithm. 
2. Institutional Ownership  
 Following the literature on institutional investors (e.g., Gompers and Metrick (2001), 
Aggarwal et al. (2011)), we use institutional ownership at the latest report date of a calendar year 
and construct ownership variables as follows. Foreign institutional ownership (FIO) is the sum of 
shares held by all institutions domiciled in a different country from where the firm’s stock is 
listed, as a percentage of the firm’s total number of shares outstanding. We set FIO to 0 if a stock 
is not held by any foreign institution. Similarly, domestic institutional ownership (DIO) is the 
sum of shares held by all institutions domiciled in the same country as the one where the firm’s 
stock is listed, as a percentage of the firm’s total number of shares outstanding. We set DIO to 0 
if a stock is not held by any domestic institution. 
3. Control Variables 
 Following the literature on innovation, we control for a full set of firm and country 
characteristics that can affect a firm’s innovation output. At the firm level, we use firm size 
(ln(SALE)), firm age (ln(AGE)), investments in intangible assets (RD), capital expenditures 
(CAPEX), asset tangibility (PPE), leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), financial constraints (the 
Kaplan and Zingales’s (KZ) (1997) index), and growth opportunities (TOBINS_Q). We also 
include industry concentration (the Herfindahl index (HHI)) and the squared Herfindahl index 
(HHI2) to mitigate the nonlinear effects of product market competition on innovation output 
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(Aghion et al. (2005)). In addition, we add the percentage of foreign sales in total sales (FSALE) 
as a firm-level control variable because MacGarvie (2006) suggests that a firm’s innovation may 
be related to its export and import markets. Last, we also control for insider ownership (INSIDE) 
because managers may have stronger incentives and greater power to pursue innovative projects 
when insider ownership increases. We winsorize all firm-level variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to eliminate the effects of outliers. 
At the country level, we adopt several controls drawn from the literature that may be 
related to firm innovation. Specifically, we follow Aghion, Howitt, and Prantl (2015) to control 
for the patent regulatory environment by using the patent right protection index of Park (2008) 
(P_INDEX). We also use 2 dimensions of worldwide governance indicators, namely, the rule of 
law (RULE) and the government effectiveness (GOODGOV) constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2011), as additional controls for country-level institutions. As Hsu et al. (2014) 
find that financial development is related to innovation, we control for equity market 
development, using the ratio of a country’s stock market capitalization to its gross domestic 
product (GDP) (EQUITY), and credit market development, which is the ratio of a country’s 
domestic credit to its GDP (CREDIT). Finally, we follow Acharya and Subramanian (2009) to 
control for a country’s GDP per capita (ln(GDP)) and its levels of exports (EXPORT) and 
imports (IMPORT), defined as the percentages of exports and imports to its GDP, respectively. 
Appendix B provides detailed variable definitions.  
C. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents sample statistics. Panel A of Table 1 reports the means of innovation 
measures and institutional ownership by economy. PATENT refers to the total number of patent 
applications that are filed by a firm and are eventually granted in a year. CITEPAT is the total 
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number of citations received by each patent. Of all the economies in the sample, Japan has the 
largest number of firms (1,309), followed by Taiwan (594), Korea (591), and Canada (246). An 
average firm in the entire sample has about 16 patents granted per year and about 27 citations 
received by its patents. Firms in Japan have the largest number of patents per year (25), followed 
by firms in Germany (21), Korea (18), Netherlands (15), Taiwan (12), and Switzerland (12). The 
pattern is broadly similar for citations. On average, a firm in a developed economy has a larger 
number of both patents and citations (17 and 28, respectively) than the one in an emerging 
economy (12 and 25, respectively). For institutional ownership, an average firm in a developed 
economy has an FIO that is just about the same as DIO (5.1% and 5.0%, respectively), whereas 
the FIO of firms in an emerging economy is substantially higher than their DIO (3.6% vs. 0.7%); 
for the entire sample, FIO is generally greater than DIO. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the summary statistics of firm and country characteristics. On 
average, a firm has a book value of assets of $315.7 million, an R&D to asset ratio of 3.2%, a 
capital expenditure-to-asset ratio of 5.5%, a PPE-to-asset ratio of 28.6%, a leverage ratio of 
21.3%, an ROA of 7.4%, and a TOBINS_Q of 1.57. The average length of time that a firm has 
been listed on a stock exchange is 14.5 years.  
III. Baseline Regression Results  
 To examine the relation between foreign institutional ownership and firm innovation, we 
estimate various forms of the following model using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions:  
(1) INNOVATION௜௝௧ 		ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵFIO௜௝௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶDIO௜௝௧ିଵ ൅	ߛ ′X௜௝௧ିଵ ൅ ߶௜ ൅ ߰௞ ൅ ߱௝
൅ ߮௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧, 
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where i, k, j, and t refer to firm, industry, country, and year, respectively. The dependent variable 
(INNOVATION) captures firm innovation outcomes: the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number 
of patents (ln(PATENT)) reflects innovation quantity; the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number 
of citations per patent (ln(CITEPAT)) captures innovation quality. We measure both foreign and 
domestic institutional ownership in year t−1. X denotes a vector of firm and country 
characteristics as discussed in Section II.B.3, which are measured in year t−1. We include year 
fixed effects (߮ሻ and firm fixed effects (߶ሻ (or industry fixed effects (߰) and country fixed 
effects (߱)) in various specifications. In all regressions, we report in parentheses robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report the results from pooled OLS regressions controlling 
for industry, country, and year fixed effects. The coefficient estimates on FIO are positive and 
significant at the 1% level across all specifications, suggesting a positive relation between 
foreign institutional ownership and innovation output. In terms of economic significance, a 
coefficient estimate of 0.010 (0.014) in model 1 (model 2) suggests that an increase in foreign 
institutional ownership from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of its distribution is 
associated with a 5.6% (7.8%) increase in the number of patents (citations per patent) in the 
following year.12 This result is economically significant.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 While the pooled OLS regression results show a positive association between foreign 
institutional ownership and firm innovation, one concern is that these results could be driven by 
omitted variables. To alleviate this concern, we include firm fixed effects (and drop industry and 
                                                            
12 This way of quantifying the size of the effect of foreign institutional ownership is consistent with several 
studies on institutional ownership, such as Chung and Zhang (2011) and Wahal and McConnell (2000). 
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country fixed effects as they do not vary within a firm) in the regressions and report the results in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. Firm fixed effects absorb time-invariant unobservable firm 
characteristics that affect both foreign institutional ownership and firm innovation. Once again, 
we find that the coefficient estimates on FIO remain positive and significant at the 1% level in all 
specifications. The magnitudes of FIO coefficient estimates become slightly smaller in columns 
3 and 4 but are still comparable to those in columns 1 and 2. This evidence suggests that our 
baseline finding is not driven by time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics.  
Regarding firm-level control variables, the coefficient estimates on DIO are not 
uniformly significant across different model specifications, suggesting that there is no clear 
evidence for the effect of domestic institutional investors on firm innovation in non-U.S 
economies. One possible explanation for this result is that domestic institutional investors in non-
U.S. economies may not satisfy the model assumptions of Aghion et al (2013), that is, they are 
weak at monitoring managers and do not effectively provide managers with insurance against 
failure. This argument is generally supported by the existing literature.13  
                                                            
13 For example, Douma, George, and Kabir (2006) document that domestic institutional investors in India 
are predominantly government-owned, which significantly reduces their monitoring incentives due to several 
problems, for example, the government’s nominees on the board are typically bureaucrats with minimal expertise in 
corporate matters. Similarly, Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) document that Japanese institutional investors are less 
likely to exercise exit or voice because, as compared with foreign investors, they have very different interests and 
relationships with the companies whose shares they hold. Trust banks, usually close affiliates of commercial banks, 
are unlikely to do anything to undermine the banks’ interests. Pension funds are hesitant to make demands on 
suppliers or customers. Life insurance companies, among the largest shareholders in the Japanese economy, tend to 
make money by selling insurance to employees of corporations in which they have ownership stakes. Banks are also 
unlikely to promote restructuring actively.  
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For other firm-level control variables, the coefficient estimates on INSIDE are positive 
and significant in firm fixed effects regressions, which suggests that insider ownership is 
positively associated with firm innovation. Larger and older firms are associated with higher 
innovation output. Firms with higher capital expenditures have more innovation output. Firms 
with higher leverage are associated with lower innovation output. Financial constraints are 
negatively related to innovation output. All these results are consistent with earlier work (e.g., 
see Hall and Lerner (2010) for a survey).  
As for country-level control variables, firms in countries with stronger patent regulatory 
environments are associated with higher innovation output. Similarly, firms located in countries 
with a higher government effectiveness index or with developed stock markets have higher 
innovation output. We find weaker evidence for the effect of exports and imports and GDP per 
capita on firm innovation.  
We conduct a few robustness checks. First, because Japanese and Taiwanese firms are 
much larger in the number of firms than the rest of our sample firms, we exclude firms in these 
two economies from the regressions. We continue to find a positive relation between foreign 
institutional ownership and firm innovation. We next use a dummy variable to capture large 
foreign institutional ownership, which equals 1 if foreign institutional ownership is greater than 
5%, and 0 otherwise. We find that foreign institutional investors holding more than 5% of equity 
ownership in a firm are positively related to firm innovation. We report these results in Table A1 
and Table A2 in the Internet Appendix (available at www.jfqa.org). 
Overall, our baseline regression results suggest a positive relation between foreign 
institutional ownership and firm innovation, consistent with our hypothesis that foreign 
institutional ownership enhances firm innovation. 
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IV. Identification Attempts 
Our evidence so far suggests a positive relation between foreign institutional ownership 
and firm innovation. While our results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects that absorb 
time-invariant unobservables, the finding may still be subject to endogeneity concerns, because 
time-varying unobservable firm characteristics omitted from the regression could bias the 
inference. Reverse causality is another concern. It is possible that firms with high innovation 
potential attract foreign institutional investors. Hence, the direction of causality goes from 
innovation to foreign institutional ownership. In this section, we attempt to address these 
identification concerns by using 2 identification strategies: a DID approach and an instrumental 
variable approach. 
A. Difference-in-Differences Approach 
Our first identification strategy is to exploit a quasi-natural experiment that generates 
plausibly exogenous variation in foreign institutional ownership: the passage of the U.S. Jobs 
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003. The JGTRRA substantially 
lowered dividend tax rates (from 38.6% to 15%) not just for U.S. firms but also for firms 
domiciled in countries that have tax treaties with the United States. Dividends from firms in non-
treaty countries, however, remain taxable at the ordinary personal income tax rate after the 
JGTRRA (e.g., 35% for the top income tax bracket). Therefore, non-treaty economies, which 
include Brazil, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, do not receive this favorable tax treatment.14 
We then use a DID approach that compares the innovation output of treatment firms with that of 
                                                            
14 The list of non-treaty economies also includes Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Jordan, Malaysia, Peru, and 
Sri Lanka.  
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control firms before and after the passage of the JGTRRA that causes an exogenous shock to 
foreign institutional ownership.  
The passage of the JGTRRA appears to be a good candidate for a quasi-natural 
experiment that generates plausibly exogenous variation in foreign institutional ownership for 
non-U.S. firms in our sample. Because the JGTRRA was designed to lower dividend tax rates for 
both U.S. firms and firms domiciled in foreign countries that have tax treaties with the United 
States, it is unlikely to be designed to directly affect the innovation output of non-U.S. firms. 
Regarding the reverse causality concern, we do not expect the change in future innovation to 
affect the change in foreign institutional ownership brought about by the passage of the 
JGTRRA. We use the DID approach to compare the innovation output of the treatment and 
control firms 3 years before (2000–2002) and 3 years after (2004–2006) the passage of the 
JGTRRA.  
To select treatment firms, we first require that these firms are domiciled in tax treaty 
countries and pay dividends in the year prior to the passage of the JGTRRA of 2002. This filter 
leaves us with 1,693 treatment firms. To select control firms, we require firms to be domiciled in 
non-treaty countries and also pay dividends in the year prior to the JGTRRA. We end up with 
228 control firms. We then match each control firm with 5 treatment firms using the nearest 
neighbor propensity score matching algorithm. Specifically, we estimate a probit model for 
observations in the year immediately preceding the passage of the JGTRRA. The dependent 
variable equals 1 for firm-year observations of the treatment group, and 0 for those of the control 
group. The probit regression has the same set of independent variables as the control variables in 
the baseline OLS regressions, which include firm- and country-level time-varying controls as 
well as industry fixed effects.  
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In addition, since the JGTRRA directly affects U.S. institutional investors, we divide 
foreign institutional ownership into U.S. foreign institutional ownership (FIOUS) and non-U.S. 
foreign institutional ownership (FIONONUS). We include 2 innovation growth variables (i.e., the 
growth in the number of patents, GROWTHPATENT, and the growth in the number of citations per 
patent, GROWTHCITATION), both computed over the 3-year period before the passage of the 
JGTRRA, in the regressions to ensure the satisfaction of the parallel trend assumption, which is a 
key identifying assumption of the DID approach.15 We end up with 456 unique treatment firms 
and 228 unique control firms.16 
Because the validity of the DID depends on the parallel trend assumption, we do 3 
diagnostic tests to verify that this assumption is not violated. In the first diagnostic test, we 
report, in Panel A of Table 3, the univariate comparisons between pre-JGTRRA’s innovation 
growth variables of treatment firms and those of control firms and their corresponding t-
statistics. Pre-JGTRRA innovation growth variables are not significantly different between 
treatment and control firms. These results suggest that there is no observable pre-JGTRRA trend 
                                                            
15 This assumption states that in the absence of treatment (the passage of the JGTRRA in our setting), the 
observed DID estimator is 0. The parallel trend assumption does not require the level of innovation variables to be 
the same between the treatment and the control firms over the two periods before and after the passage of the 
JGTRRA, because these distinctions are differenced out in the estimation. Instead, this assumption requires similar 
pre-JGTRRA trends in innovation variables for both the treatment and the control groups. 
16 Because we require treatment and control firms to pay dividends, the DID sample is different from our 
baseline sample. To check whether our baseline results continue to hold in this DID sample, we reestimate the 
baseline regressions in this sample, and find a positive effect of foreign institutional ownership on firm innovation. 
We report the results in Panel A of Table A3 in the Internet Appendix.  
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in innovation outcomes between the two groups of firms, suggesting the satisfaction of the 
parallel trend assumption. 
In the second diagnostic test, we plot the average logarithm number of patents (citations 
per patent) for treatment and control firms over a 7-year period around the passage of the 
JGTRRA in Graph A (B) of Figure 1. As one can observe, the two lines trend closely in parallel 
in the years leading up to the passage of the JGTRRA, which suggests the satisfaction of the 
parallel trend assumption. In addition, after the passage of the JGTRRA, the line representing 
treatment firms begins to trend upward across the line representing control firms, suggesting that 
treatment firms experience an increase in innovation output.  
In the third test, we reestimate the probit model, restricted to the matched sample, and 
find that the coefficient estimates of the pre-JGTRRA innovation growth variables 
(GROWTHPATENT and GROWTHCITATION) are not statistically significant. We report this test in 
Table A4 of the Internet Appendix. Overall, these diagnostic tests suggest that the propensity 
score matching process reasonably removes meaningful observable differences in the covariates 
between treatment and control firms.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results of the univariate DID test. We compute DID 
estimators for innovation variables by first subtracting the average number of patents (citations) 
over the 3-year period preceding the passage of the JGTRRA from the average number of patents 
(citations) over the 3-year period post JGTRRA for each treatment and control firm. We then 
average the difference over the two groups and report the results in columns 1 and 2, 
respectively. In columns 3 and 4, we report the DID estimates and the corresponding t-statistics 
with the null hypothesis that the DID estimates are 0, respectively.  
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Results in columns 3 and 4 of Panel B show that the DID estimators are positive and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the increase in innovation output is significantly 
larger for the treatment group than for the control group during the period from 3 years before to 
3 years after the passage of the JGTRRA. The magnitudes of the DID estimates are economically 
significant as well. For example, the DID estimate on ln(PATENT) is 0.099, suggesting that 
treatment firms experience an increase of 11% in ln(PATENT) relative to the mean ln(PATENT) 
of control firms (0.853) surrounding the passage of the JGTRRA. Similarly, the DID estimator 
for ln(CITEPAT) is 0.123, indicating that treatment firms experience an increase of 14% in 
ln(CITEPAT) relative to the mean ln(CITEPAT) of control firms (0.850) surrounding the 
passage of the JGTRRA. 
Next, we perform the DID tests in a multivariate regression framework by estimating the 
following model: 
(2) INNOVATION௜௧൫FIO୙ୗ೔೟൯ 				ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚTREAT௜ൈPOST௧ ൅ ߛᇱ ௜ܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ߶௜ ൅ ߮௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧, 
where the dependent variable INNOVATION captures firm innovation outcomes: the natural 
logarithm of 1 plus the number of patents (ln(PATENT)); the natural logarithm of 1 plus the 
number of citations received by each patent (ln(CITEPAT)). The dependent variable FIOUS 
captures U.S. foreign institutional ownership. TREAT is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
treatment firms, and 0 for control firms. POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fiscal year 
is after 2003, and 0 otherwise. X consists of non-U.S. foreign institutional ownership and a 
vector of firm- and country-level control variables used in equation (1). ߶௜	and ߮௧ represent firm 
fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively.17 The coefficient estimate on TREAT×POST is 
                                                            
17 TREAT and POST are absorbed by firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
28 
 
the DID estimator that captures the causal effect of U.S. foreign institutional ownership on firm 
innovation.18 
Panel C of Table 3 reports the regression results estimating equation (2) with standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. In models 1 and 2, where the dependent variables are FIOUS, 
the coefficient estimates on TREAT×POST are positive and statistically significant, which 
suggests that treatment firms, on average, experience an increase in U.S. foreign institutional 
ownership following the passage of JGTRRA. For example, a coefficient estimate of 1.501 in 
model 1 suggests that U.S. foreign institutional ownership in treatment firms is 1.5% higher than 
that in control firms subsequent to the passage of the JGTRRA. In models 3–6, where the 
dependent variables are ln(PATENT) or ln(CITEPAT), the coefficient estimates on 
TREAT×POST are positive and significant at the 1% level, which suggests that treatment firms, 
on average, experience a larger increase in innovation output than control firms following the 
passage of the JGTRRA. A coefficient estimate of 0.091 (0.115) in model 4 (model 6) suggests 
that, compared with the control group, the treatment group experiences an increase of 9.1% 
(11.5%) in the number of patents (the number of citations per patent).  
To ensure that our DID test results are robust, we conduct a few more tests. First, because 
it is plausible that firms anticipate the passage of the JGTRRA, our selection of  treatment and 
control firms that pay dividends 1 year in advance of the event could still be subject to potential 
endogeneity. To address this concern, we require that treatment and control firms pay dividends 
                                                            
18 When we run a similar regression with FIONONUS being the dependent variable, we find that the 
coefficient estimate on TREAT×POST is not significant. We report the results in Panel B of Table A3 in the Internet 
Appendix. 
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2 years, as compared to 1 year, prior to the passage of the JGTRRA (i.e., starting from 2001) and 
repeat the DID analysis. Our DID results do not change qualitatively. We report these results in 
Table A5 in the Internet Appendix.  
Second, if the passage of the JGTRRA affects U.S. foreign institutional ownership of 
dividend-paying stocks in treaty countries, then this event should not affect the U.S. institutional 
ownership of non-dividend paying stocks in these treaty countries. As a result, the innovation 
output of non-dividend paying stocks in treaty countries should not differ significantly from that 
of non-dividend paying stocks in non-treaty countries surrounding the event. We thus conduct 
one placebo test by selecting treatment and control firms that do not pay dividends in 2002 and 
perform a similar DID analysis. We find that the DID estimators are statistically insignificant, 
which suggests that the event does not have a significant effect on the innovation output of non-
dividend paying stocks in both treaty and non-treaty countries. This placebo test indicates that 
our main DID test results are unlikely to be driven by chance. 
Third, we argue that if the JGTRRA affects U.S. institutional investors, there should be 
no significant difference in the innovation output between dividend-paying firms that do not 
have U.S. foreign institutional ownership in treaty countries and those in non-treaty countries. 
We thus conduct a second placebo test by selecting treatment and control firms that have zero 
U.S. institutional ownership in 2002. We find insignificant DID estimators, which supports our 
conjecture. We report the results for the above two placebo tests in Table A6 in the Internet 
Appendix.  
B. Instrumental Variable Approach 
The use of the passage of the JGTRRA in the DID approach is not completely free of 
concerns. For example, even though Desai and Dharmapala (2011) find that following the 
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passage of the JGTRRA, U.S. institutions tilt their portfolio allocations to dividend paying 
equities in treaty countries, Ammer, Holland, Smith, and Warnock (2012) document that this 
finding becomes weaker after controlling for international cross-listing. It is plausible that the 
passage of the JGTRRA reduces the cost of equity capital for innovative firms and incentivizes 
these firms to finance future projects through cross-listing in the United States. As a result, the 
passage of the JGTRRA could lead to more innovation and U.S. institutional ownership.  
To further ensure that the documented results are likely to be causal, our second 
identification strategy is to construct an instrumental variable and use the 2-stage least squares 
(2SLS) approach. An ideal instrument should capture the variation in foreign institutional 
ownership that is exogenous to a firm’s innovation output. Because the exclusion restriction of 
an instrument is inherently untestable, the instrument needs to be conceptually motivated.  
We follow Aggarwal et al. (2011) and use the time-varying membership in the MSCI All 
Country World Index to create a possible exogenous variation in foreign institutional ownership. 
The MSCI is a free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted index that is designed to 
measure the global equity market performance. Launched in 1987, this index consists of 45 
indices (24 developed and 21 emerging country indices), with coverage of about 85% of the 
global investable equity opportunity set. Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Leuz et al. (2010) find 
that MSCI membership increases the equity ownership of foreign institutional investors in the 
firms. We define the instrument as a dummy variable (MSCI) that equals 1 if a firm is a member 
of the MSCI index in year t, and 0 otherwise, and present the IV regression results in Table 4. 
The regressions control for firm- and country-level characteristics, as well as firm, industry, 
country, and year fixed effects in various specifications.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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To check the relevance of the instrument, in models 1 and 4 of Table 4, we present the 
first-stage regression with FIO as the dependent variable and the instrument as the main 
independent variable. We include the same set of independent variables as those used in the 
baseline regressions in Table 2. The coefficient estimates on MSCI are positive and significant at 
the 1% level, suggesting that the MSCI dummy is positively associated with FIO. The p-value of 
the F-test of the instrument shown at the bottom of the table is close to 0, indicating that the 
instrument is highly correlated with FIO. Based on the rule of thumb with one instrument for one 
endogenous variable, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the instrument is weak. 
Therefore, the coefficient estimates and their corresponding standard errors in the second stage 
are likely to be unbiased and inferences based on them are reasonably valid. However, a caveat 
of the IV approach may be in order. While the above tests ensure that the MSCI dummy satisfies 
the relevance condition, we cannot directly test the exclusion restriction of the instrument. It is 
plausible that some unobservable factors affect both the inclusion of MSCI membership and 
foreign institutional ownership. Hence, our instrument needs to be conceptually motivated based 
on existing studies.   
In columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 of Table 4, the coefficient estimates on the fitted (instrumented) 
values of FIO are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which suggests that 
foreign institutional ownership appears to have a positive effect on innovation output. The 
economic effect is sizable. A coefficient estimate of 0.037 (0.046) in column 5 (column 6) 
suggests that an increase in the instrumented foreign institutional ownership from the 25th 
percentile to the 75th percentile of its distribution leads to a 21% (26%) increase in the number 
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of patents (citation per patent).19 If we compare these coefficient estimates with the OLS results 
in Table 2, these coefficient estimates from the 2SLS analyses are substantially larger, which 
suggests that the OLS results underestimate the positive effects of foreign institutional ownership 
on firm innovation. 
In summary, consistent with our hypothesis, our identification tests based on both the 
DID approach and the IV approach provide evidence that the effect of foreign institutional 
ownership on firm innovation appears to be causal. One caution, however, is that, because 
neither the passage of the JGTRRA nor the MSCI index membership is perfectly exogenous to 
innovation output and both strategies have their own limitations, we cannot completely rule out 
the possibility that our main results are driven by endogeneity in foreign institutional ownership. 
Therefore, one needs to be cautious when interpreting and generalizing our results.  
V. Possible Economic Mechanisms 
In this section, we explore three possible underlying economic mechanisms through 
which foreign institutional investors promote firm innovation. Although we attempt to identify 
different economic mechanisms that underlie the positive effect of foreign institutional 
ownership on innovation, we acknowledge that these underlying mechanisms are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and if anything, may jointly contribute to the positive effect of foreign 
institutions on innovation.  
                                                            
19 Note that the coefficient estimates on LEV and TOBINS_Q become statistically insignificant while they 
are significant in the OLS regressions. One plausible reason is that the effects of LEV and TOBINS_Q on firm 
innovation are driven by foreign institutional investors. Once “cleaned” foreign institutional ownership (through 
instrumented FIO) is included in the regressions, we are better able to capture the effects of foreign institutional 
investors on firm innovation, which absorbs the effects of LEV and TOBINS_Q on innovation. 
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A. Monitoring 
Due to agency problems caused by the separation of ownership and control, a potential 
moral hazard problem emerges in which firm managers overinvest in routine tasks that are less 
challenging to enjoy private benefits (Hart (1983), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)). The 
theory of Stein (1988) shows that managers could underinvest in innovative projects due to their 
being high-risk in nature and not generating predictable returns in the short run.  
Monitoring by institutional investors is thus an important governance mechanism to 
mitigate managerial myopia. Compared with small investors who are relatively less informed, 
institutional investors are better able to provide effective and active monitoring due to their large 
ownership stakes in firms, as well as their ability to exploit the economy of scale in information 
production and processing (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Grossman and Hart (1988), and 
Gillan and Starks (2000), (2003)). However, not all institutions are actively engaged in 
monitoring. For instance, Bushee (1998) finds that institutional investors with short-term 
investments induce managerial myopia while institutions with long-term investments reduce 
managers’ myopic behavior. Chen et al. (2007) show that long-term institutions focus more on 
monitoring and influencing efforts than on trading. They also find that independent institutions 
are more inclined to gather information and get actively involved in the corporate decisions of 
firms in which they invest, while grey institutions are more likely to hold shares without 
intervening in firms’ business.20  
We thus postulate that if monitoring by foreign institutional investors contributes to 
increases in firm innovation, then those foreign institutions that have strong incentives to 
                                                            
20 Chen et al. (2007) define mutual fund managers and investment advisors as “independent institutions” 
and bank trusts, insurance companies, pension funds, and endowments as “grey” institutions.  
34 
 
monitor, that is, independent or long-term foreign institutions, should play a more significant role 
in promoting firm innovation. As such, we separate foreign institutional ownership into 2 
components: ownership by independent (or long-term) foreign institutional investors and by grey 
(or short-term) foreign institutional investors. We then examine the effects of these types of 
foreign institutions on firm innovation.  
Similar to our main analysis, we use OLS regressions with firm fixed effects and the DID 
analysis to test our conjecture. We present the results in Table 5. In Panel A, we reestimate the 
baseline OLS regressions but distinguish between independent and grey institutions, as well as 
long-term and short-term institutions. Columns 1 and 3 focus on 2 key independent variables: the 
percentage of shares held by independent institutions (FIOINDEPENDENT), such as mutual funds and 
investment advisors, and the percentage of shares held by grey institutions (FIOGREY), such as 
bank trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions. The coefficient estimates on 
FIOINDEPENDENT are positive and significant at the 1% or 5% level in these models. However, the 
coefficient estimates on FIOGREY are statistically insignificant. These results imply that the 
positive effect of foreign institutional investors on firm innovation is largely driven by 
independent institutions, who are more actively engaged in monitoring.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
In columns 2 and 4 of Panel A of Table 5, we classify foreign institutions into long-term 
and short-term institutional investors based on investment horizon and re-run the regressions by 
focusing on 2 independent variables, FIOLONG_TERM (the percentage of shares held by foreign 
institutions for more than 1 year) and FIOSHORT_TERM (the percentage of shares held by foreign 
institutions for less than 1 year). The coefficient estimates on FIOLONG_TERM are positive and 
significant at the 1% level in both models, while the coefficient estimates on FIOSHORT_TERM are 
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insignificant. This evidence suggests that the positive effect of foreign institutional ownership on 
firm innovation is mainly driven by long-term foreign institutional investors. 
In addition to these firm fixed effects regressions, we conduct the DID test in Panel B of 
Table 5. We perform the DID analysis for different types of institutions using the same 
procedures discussed in Section IV.A. When undertaking the propensity score matching 
algorithm, we use the same set of matching variables as before except that the equity ownership 
of U.S. foreign institutions (FIOUS) is replaced with the equity ownership of a certain type of 
U.S. foreign institution (independent, grey, long-term, or short-term U.S. foreign institutions). 
Using this matching procedure, we assume that the treatment group experiences, to some extent, 
exogenous changes in equity ownership for each type of U.S. foreign institution following the 
passage of the JGTRRA.  
After conducting the matching procedure for each type of U.S. foreign institution, we 
compute the DID estimators for innovation variables in the same way as in Section IV.A. We 
find that the DID estimates for independent or long-term U.S. foreign institutions are positive 
and significant at the 1% or 5% levels, while the DID estimates for grey or short-term U.S. 
foreign institutions are largely insignificant. These results once again suggest that the positive 
effect of foreign institutional ownership on firm innovation is primarily driven by independent or 
long-term foreign institutions.  
Overall, this subsection shows that independent or long-term foreign institutional 
investors, who actively monitor firms, play a crucial role in motivating innovation. This evidence 
suggests that intensive monitoring by foreign institutional investors appears to be a possible 
underlying mechanism through which foreign institutional investors enhance firm innovation.  
B. Insurance 
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Economics and psychology literature on motivating innovation has shown that while the 
standard pay-for-performance incentive scheme has positive effects on motivating effort in 
routine tasks, it may actually undermine performance in tasks that require creativity and 
exploration (Glucksberg (1962), Manso (2001)). Incentive schemes that motivate innovation 
must exhibit substantial tolerance for failure, implying that compensation schemes that are less 
sensitive to performance can, to some extent, motivate innovation better (Holmstrom (1989), 
Ederer and Manso (2013)).  
Aghion et al. (2013) find that managerial turnover in U.S. firms is less sensitive to firm 
performance in the presence of institutional investors, consistent with the argument that 
institutional investors provide partial insurance to managers with career or reputational concerns 
against failure risks arising from their intensive innovation activities. Ederer and Manso (2013) 
show that a manager’s incentive to innovate is undermined by the threat of contractual 
termination in an experimental study. Based on these studies, we argue that if foreign 
institutional investors promote innovation by insulating managers from punishment for 
innovation failures, CEO turnover and compensation should be less sensitive to performance in 
the presence of foreign institutional investors. 
To test this conjecture, we collect CEO turnover data from the BoardEx database and 
match them with our sample firms for the period from 2000 to 2010. We are able to match 167 
CEO turnover events in our sample firms and end up with 755 firm-year observations in the 
matched sample. Similarly, we collect CEO compensation data from BoardEx and match them 
with our sample firms. The resulting matched sample contains 785 firm-year observations. 
To test the effect of foreign institutional ownership on the CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity, we follow Aghion et al. (2013) and estimate the following linear probability model:  
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(3) CEO_TURN௜௧  = ߙ ൅ ߚଵ∆ROA௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶFIO௜௧ିଵൈ∆ROA௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷDIO௜௧ିଵൈ∆ROA௜௧ିଵ ൅
ߚସFIO௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହDIO௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺lnሺMCAPሻ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߶௜ ൅ ߮௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧,  
where i and t refer to firm and year, respectively. CEO_TURN is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the CEO leaves firm i during year t, and 0 otherwise. ∆ROA is the change in profitability in 
percentage points. ln(MCAP) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. The specification 
includes firm fixed effects (߶ሻ and year fixed effects (߮ሻ. 
To examine the effect of institutional ownership on pay-for-performance sensitivity, we 
follow Hartzell and Starks (2003) and estimate the following model:  
(4) ∆CEO_CASH	ሺTOTALሻ௜௧   = ߙ ൅ ߚଵ∆WEALTH௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶFIO௜௧ିଵൈ∆WEALTH௜௧ିଵ ൅
ߚଷDIO௜௧ିଵൈ∆WEALTH௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସFIO௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହDIO௜௧ିଵ ൅
ߚ଺lnሺMCAPሻ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߶௜ ൅ ߮௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧,  
where i and t refer to firm and year, respectively. ∆CEO_CASH (TOTAL) is the change in the 
level of cash and bonus compensation (total compensation, which includes cash, bonus, equity, 
option, and long-term incentive plans). ∆WEALTH is the change in market value from period 
t−1 to t. The specification includes firm fixed effects (߶ሻ and year fixed effects (߮ሻ. 
To address the endogeneity concern, we first estimate regressions with firm fixed effects 
to absorb time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics. Panel A of Table 6 reports the results 
estimating equations (3) and (4). Model 1 presents the results estimating equation (3). Consistent 
with the previous literature, we observe that a higher profitability growth is associated with a 
lower probability that the CEO will be fired, as suggested by a negative and significant 
coefficient estimate on ∆ROA (−0.011). More importantly, the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term, FIO×∆ROA, is positive and significant at the 5% level (0.001), which suggests 
that the negative effect of performance on CEO turnovers is mitigated by foreign institutional 
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ownership. In other words, in firms with greater foreign institutional ownership, CEO 
performance-turnover sensitivity is lower. In terms of economic significance, an increase in 
foreign institutional ownership from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of its distribution 
leads to a decrease in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance from 1.1% to 0.54%.21  
Models 2 and 3 of Table 6 examine how foreign institutional ownership affects the 
CEO’s pay-for-performance sensitivity. The dependent variable is the change in cash and bonus 
compensation (model 2) or the change in total compensation (model 3). Consistent with Hartzell 
and Starks (2003), the coefficient estimates on ∆WEALTH are positive and significant, 
suggesting that changes in shareholder wealth are positively related to changes in CEO 
compensation. More importantly, the coefficient estimates on the interaction term, 
FIO×∆WEALTH, are negative and significant at the 5% level in both specifications, suggesting 
that greater foreign institutional ownership largely weakens the CEO’s pay-for-performance 
sensitivity.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Next, we perform a DID analysis and present the results in Panel B of Table 6. 
Specifically, we match CEO turnover and compensation data from the BoardEx database with 
                                                            
21 We have both FIO and ∆ROA measured in percentage points and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
performance is ∂Pr(CEO_TURN)/∂∆ROA = −0.011+0.001×FIO, where −0.011 and 0.001 are the coefficient 
estimates on ∆ROA and FIOൈ∆ROA, respectively. An increase in foreign institutional ownership from the 25th 
percentile (FIO = 0) to the 75th percentile (FIO = 5.585) of its distribution is associated with a decrease in the 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance from 1.1% [(−0.011+0.001×0)×100 = −1.1%] to 0.54% 
[(−0.011+0.001×5.585)×100  −0.54%]. 
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the DID analysis sample as constructed in Section IV.A that has 456 treatment firms and 228 
control firms. The final samples consist of 110 firm-year observations for the CEO turnover test 
and 121 firm-year observations for the CEO compensation test. To conduct the DID analysis for 
this mechanism, we estimate the following two models: 
(5) CEO_TURN௜௧   = ߙ ൅ ߚଵ∆ROA௜௧ିଵൈTREAT௜ൈPOST௧ ൅ ߚଶ∆ROA௜௧ିଵൈTREAT௜ ൅
ߚଷ∆ROA௜௧ିଵൈPOST௧ ൅ ߚସ∆ROA௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହTREAT௜ൈPOST௧ ൅
ߚ଺lnሺMCAPሻ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߶௜ ൅ ߮௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧,  
 
(6) ∆CEO_CASH	ሺTOTALሻ௜௧    = ߙ ൅ ߚଵ∆WEALTH௜௧ିଵൈTREAT௜ൈPOST௧ ൅
ߚଶ∆WEALTH௜௧ିଵൈTREAT௜ ൅ ߚଷ∆WEALTH௜௧ିଵൈ
POST௧ ൅ ߚସ∆WEALTH௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହTREAT௜ൈPOST௧ ൅
ߚ଺ln	ሺMCAPሻ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߶௜ ൅ ߮௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧,  
where i and t refer to firm and year, respectively. CEO_TURN, ∆ROA, ∆CEO_CASH (TOTAL), 
∆WEALTH, TREAT, POST, and ln(MCAP) are defined the same way as those in equations (3) 
and (4). The specification includes firm fixed effects (߶ሻ and year fixed effects (߮ሻ. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and bootstrapped with 1,000 replications.   
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results estimating equations (5) and (6). Model 1 presents 
the results estimating equation (5). We find that the coefficient estimate on the triple interaction 
term, ∆ROA×TREAT×POST, is positive and significant at the 5% level. These results suggest 
that the negative effect of performance on CEO turnover is mitigated more for treatment firms 
than for control firms following the passage of the JGTRRA. Models 2 and 3 present the results 
estimating equation (6). The coefficient estimates on the triple interaction term, 
∆WEALTH×TREAT×POST, are negative and significant at the 10% and the 1% levels in 
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models 2 and 3, respectively. These results suggest that treatment firms’ pay-for-performance 
sensitivity becomes weaker than that of control firms after the passage of the JGTRRA.  
Overall, in this subsection we show that the sensitivities of CEO turnover and 
compensation to firm performance are weakened in the presence of foreign institutional 
investors. This finding is consistent with the argument that, by providing insurance to managers 
with career and reputational concerns, foreign institutional investors allow managers to focus 
more on long-term, risky investment in innovative projects and hence positively contribute to 
their investee firms’ innovation output.  
C. Knowledge Spillovers  
In this subsection, we explore a third possible mechanism through which foreign 
institutions contribute positively to firm innovation. Besides monitoring and insurance, foreign 
institutions could enhance innovation through facilitating knowledge spillovers in their cross-
border investment activities. Compared to domestic institutional investors, this mechanism is 
unique to foreign institutional investors.  
Investment in knowledge creation by one party facilitates innovation by others (Jaffe et 
al. (2000)). Knowledge spillovers could be indirect and involve different types of stakeholders 
including firms, investors, customers, suppliers, competitors, and governments. The literature has 
suggested that the locus of innovation and knowledge circulation lies in dynamic, competency-
based, business networks (Voss (2003), Walters and Buchanan (2001), and Wright and Burns 
(1998)). One example is that CEO network connections facilitate corporate innovation (Faleye, 
Kovacs, and Venkateswaran (2014)). In this regard, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
foreign institutional investors could facilitate networks among different stakeholders. For 
example, Laurence Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, a leading U.S. investment management 
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company with investments in over 100 countries and offices in 30 countries, including India, 
offered to host a global investors meeting in India in early 2015 in response to the call for 
investment by the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, during his visit to the United States 
in 2014 (http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-after-meeting-pm-narendra-modi-blackrock-ceo-
offers-to-host-global-investors-meet-in-india-in-2015-2022468). This example suggests that 
foreign institutions could facilitate knowledge spillovers through business networks by acting as 
a bridge between local firms and foreign firms or investors, so that they could exchange 
opportunities and knowledge, which then could contribute to innovation.  
Knowledge spillovers can also occur within a multinational corporation. In a study of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions, Ferreira et al. (2010) find that foreign institutional 
investors are a driving force behind cross-border mergers and acquisitions because they act as 
facilitators, build bridges between firms, and reduce transaction costs and information 
asymmetry between bidders and target acquisitions. Relatedly, Guadalupe et al. (2012) find that 
after being acquired by foreign acquirers, domestic firms are likely to innovate through their 
access to foreign technologies and widening foreign markets. Based on these two studies, a 
reasonable argument is that foreign institutional investors could contribute to the innovation of 
domestic firms through facilitating cross-border mergers and acquisitions, and ultimately, 
knowledge spillovers. 
Along these lines, we argue that one possible channel through which foreign institutional 
investors promote innovation is that they facilitate knowledge spillovers from a more innovative 
economy to a less innovative economy. They can do so by acting as a facilitator in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions, or as a bridge for a network of managers, investors, and other 
stakeholders of foreign and domestic firms to exchange knowledge, ideas, and opportunities, 
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which, to a certain extent, contributes to investee firms’ innovation. If our conjecture is 
supported, the innovativeness of institutional investors’ home countries should play a role in firm 
innovation. In particular, foreign institutional investors from economies with a higher level of 
innovation output may affect investee firms’ innovation output to a larger extent than those from 
economies with a lower level of innovation output, because the former can provide better advice 
and/or have better expertise on how to speed up knowledge transfers. 
We test this hypothesis using a data set of country-level patents collected from the World 
Bank database.22 We construct 4 measures of country-level innovativeness for each of the 73 
countries in which the institutions in our sample are domiciled. The first measure is the total 
number of patents applied for by all residents of a country in a year scaled by its GDP 
(PATENT_GDP). The second measure is the total number of patents applied for by all residents 
of a country in a year scaled by its total population (PATENT_POP). The third measure is the 
total number of patents applied for by all residents of a country in a year scaled by its total 
number of listed firms (PATENT_FIRMS). The last measure is the total number of patents 
applied for by all residents of a country in a year scaled by its market capitalization 
(PATENT_MCAP). We then take the average of each of these country-level innovativeness 
measures over the 2000–2010 period. We define an institution’s home country as a high- (low-) 
innovation country if the country’s innovation measure is above (below) the median of all 73 
countries’ measures. We then classify foreign institutional ownership according to whether the 
                                                            
22 While the DWPI database contains patent information at the assignee level, it does not have detailed 
information on the resident country of assignees. The World Bank patent database provides aggregate country-level 
data on both resident and non-resident patent holders. 
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institutional investors come from high-innovation countries or low-innovation countries and 
examine the effects of these ownership components on firm innovation.  
We run OLS regressions with firm fixed effects to mitigate the endogeneity concern. We 
reestimate the baseline regressions but distinguish between the ownership of foreign institutional 
investors from high-innovation countries (FIOHIGH_INNO) and the ownership of foreign 
institutional investors from low-innovation countries (FIOLOW_INNO). Panel A of Table 7 presents 
these regression results based on the innovativeness of foreign institutional investors’ home 
countries in which the dependent variables are ln(PATENT) (models 1–4) and ln(CITEPAT) 
(models 5–8). The results show that the coefficient estimates on FIOHIGH_INNO are positive and 
significant in almost all models except for model 4. The coefficient estimates on FIOLOW_INNO are 
insignificant in all specifications. These results suggest that the positive effect of foreign 
institutional ownership on firm innovation is largely driven by institutions from high-innovation 
foreign countries.  
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
However, it is plausible that the innovativeness of institutional investors’ home countries 
might be correlated with their institutional environments. To address this concern, we include 
country-level governance of foreign institutions, measured by the anti-self-dealing index of La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006), in our analysis. Specifically, we classify foreign 
institutional investors into 4 groups according to whether a foreign institution comes from a high 
(low)-innovation (or governance) country. An institution’s home country is defined as a high- or 
low-governance country if its anti-self-dealing index is above or below the median of all 
domiciled countries of the sample institutional investors. We classify foreign institutions into 4 
groups: high-innovation and high-governance countries (FIOHIGHINNO_HIGHGOV), high-innovation 
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and low-governance countries (FIOHIGHINNO_LOWGOV), low-innovation and high-governance 
countries (FIOLOWINNO_HIGHGOV), and low-innovation and low-governance countries 
(FIOLOWINNO_LOWGOV).  
In Panel B of Table 7, we find that the coefficient estimates on FIOHIGHINNO_HIGHGOV are 
positive and significant, suggesting that foreign institutions from high-innovation and high-
governance countries positively influence firm innovation. In addition, the coefficient estimates 
on FIOHIGHINNO_LOWGOV remain positive and significant (except for models 4 and 8), which 
suggests that those foreign institutions from high-innovation but low-governance countries 
positively affect the innovation of their investee firms. In summary, we find evidence suggesting 
that foreign institutions coming from high-innovation countries regardless of their governance 
level positively affect firm innovation.  
To the extent that the United States is the most innovative country in our sample, the DID 
analysis reported in Panel C of Table 3 also provides evidence that supports this underlying 
economic mechanism. Specifically, the coefficient estimates on TREAT×POST, which captures 
the exogenous increase in U.S. foreign institutional ownership following the passage of the 
JGTRRA, are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level while those of FIONONUS are 
significant only at the marginal level. The magnitudes of these estimates on TREAT×POST are 
much larger (5 times larger) than those on FIONONUS. These results suggest that a positive shock 
in foreign equity ownership of institutions coming from a more innovative country (e.g., the 
United States) leads to a significantly larger increase in the innovation output of investee firms. 
Overall, in this subsection we show that the innovativeness of foreign institutional 
investors’ home countries positively contributes to investee firms’ innovation output, which 
suggests that innovation travels with foreign institutions that come from high-innovation 
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countries. Hence, knowledge spillovers are a plausible mechanism through which foreign 
institutional investors promote innovation.23   
VI. Conclusion 
We examine the effect of foreign institutional investors on firm innovation. Using firm-
level data across 26 non-U.S. economies for the 2000–2010 period, we document a positive 
effect of foreign institutional ownership on firm innovation. To address endogeneity concerns, 
we use both an instrumental variable approach and a DID approach that relies on a plausibly 
exogenous variation in foreign institutional ownership generated by a quasi-natural experiment, 
the passage of the JGTRRA. Our identification tests suggest that this positive effect is causal.  
We further explore three possible underlying economic mechanisms through which 
foreign institutional investors promote innovation. We find that foreign institutions promote firm 
innovation by acting as active monitors, by providing insurance against innovation failures to 
firm managers with career or reputational concerns, and by promoting knowledge spillovers 
                                                            
23 It is reasonable to argue that foreign institutional ownership affects firm innovation over a long-term 
period and how fast this effect takes place should depend on the underlying economic mechanisms. We thus extend 
our analysis by using 2- or 3-year instead of 1-year-ahead innovation measures as the dependent variables in the 
baseline regression, as well as in regressions that explore the underlying economic mechanisms. Under the 
monitoring mechanism, it appears that foreign institutional investors have more immediate effects on firm 
innovation, as the coefficient estimates on FIOINDEPENDENT and FIOLONG_TERM become less significant when the 2- or  
3-year lead innovation measures are used as the dependent variables. On the other hand, in the knowledge spillover 
mechanism, it apparently takes foreign institutional investors longer time before they could influence firm 
innovation, because the coefficient estimates on FIOHIGH_INNO remain highly significant when the 2-year-ahead 
innovation measures are used as the dependent variables. We present these regression results in Table A7 in the 
Internet Appendix. 
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from high-innovation countries. Our paper provides the first rigorous empirical study to examine 
the role of foreign institutional investors in motivating technological innovation outside the 
United States.  
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APPENDIX A  
Thomson Reuters’s DWPI Classification System 
DWPI categorizes patents using a simple classification for all technologies. Patents are 
divided into 3 broad areas: Chemical, Engineering, and Electronic and Electrical Engineering. 
Each of these is then further classified into smaller subject areas called “Sections,” which 
describe the technical area or areas covered by the patent. There are a total of 20 such sections, 
designated A–M for Chemical, P–Q for Engineering, and S–X for Electronic and Electrical 
Engineering.  
 
Chemical 
A. Polymers and Plastics 
B. Pharmaceuticals 
C. Agricultural Chemicals 
D. Food, Detergents, Water Treatment and Biotechnology 
E. General Chemicals 
F. Textiles and Paper-Making 
G. Printing, Coating, Photographic 
H. Petroleum 
J. Chemical Engineering 
K. Nucleonics, Explosives and Protection 
L. Refractories, Ceramics, Cement and Electro(in)organics 
M. Metallurgy 
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Engineering 
P1. Agriculture, Food, Tobacco 
P2. Personal, Domestic 
P3. Health, Amusement 
P4. Separating, Mixing 
P5. Shaping Metal 
P6. Shaping Non-metal 
P7. Pressing, Printing 
P8. Optics, Photography, General 
Q1. Vehicles in General 
Q2. Special Vehicles 
Q3. Conveying, Packaging, Storing 
Q4. Buildings, Construction 
Q5. Engines, Pumps 
Q6. Engineering Elements 
Q7. Lighting, Heating 
 
Electronic and Electrical Engineering 
S. Instrumentation, Measuring and Testing 
T. Computing and Control 
U. Semiconductors and Electronic Circuitry 
V. Electronic Components 
W. Communications 
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X. Electric Power Engineering 
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Appendix B. Variable Definitions  
 
1. Innovation Variables (Source: Thomson Innovation) 
ln(PATENT): Natural logarithm of 1 plus the total number of patents granted to each firm in 
each year scaled by the mean number of patent applications filed in a year for 
technology groups to which the patent belongs.  
ln(CITEPAT): Natural logarithm of 1 plus the total number of citations made to each firm’s 
patents in each year scaled by the mean citation count received by each patent in a year 
for technology groups to which the patent belongs.   
 
2. Institutional Ownership Variables (Source: FactSet Ownership) 
DIO: Domestic institutional ownership, defined as the sum of shares owned by all institutions 
domiciled in the same country as where the stock is listed, as a percentage of the firm’s 
total number of shares outstanding, set to 0 if the stock is not held by any institution.  
FIO: Foreign institutional ownership, defined as the sum of shares owned by all institutions 
domiciled in a country different from where the stock is listed, as a percentage of the 
firm’s total number of shares outstanding, set to 0 if the stock is not held by any 
institution. 
FIOINDEPENDENT: Independent foreign institutional ownership, defined as the sum of shares 
owned by all active foreign institutions (mutual funds and independent investment 
advisers), as a percentage of the firm’s total number of shares outstanding. 
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FIOGREY: Grey foreign institutional ownership, defined as the sum of shares owned by all 
passive foreign institutions (bank trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions), 
as a percentage of the firm’s total number of shares outstanding. 
FIOLONG_TERM: Long-term foreign institutional ownership, defined as the sum of shares owned 
by all foreign institutions that hold the stock for more than 1 year, as a percentage of 
the firm’s total number of shares outstanding. 
FIOSHORT_TERM: Short-term foreign institutional ownership, defined as the sum of shares 
owned by all foreign institutions that hold the stock for less than 1 year, as a percentage 
of the firm’s total number of shares outstanding. 
FIOHIGH_INNO: High-innovation foreign institutional ownership, defined as the sum of shares 
owned by all foreign institutions that come from high-innovation countries, as a 
percentage of the firm’s total number of shares outstanding. 
FIOLOW_INNO: Low-innovation foreign institutional ownership, defined as the sum of shares 
owned by all foreign institutions that come from low-innovation countries, as a 
percentage of the firm’s total number of shares outstanding. 
FIOHIGHINNO_HIGHGOV: High-innovation and high-governance foreign institutional ownership, 
defined as the sum of shares owned by all foreign institutions that come from high-
innovation and high-governance countries, as a percentage of the firm’s total number 
of shares outstanding. 
FIOHIGHINNO_LOWGOV: High-innovation and low-governance foreign institutional ownership, 
defined as the sum of shares owned by all foreign institutions that come from high-
innovation and low-governance countries as a percentage of the firm’s total number of 
shares outstanding. 
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FIOLOWINNO_HIGHGOV: Low-innovation and high-governance foreign institutional ownership, 
defined as the sum of shares owned by all foreign institutions that come from low-
innovation and high-governance countries, as a percentage of the firm’s total number 
of shares outstanding. 
FIOLOWINNO_LOWGOV: Low-innovation and low-governance foreign institutional ownership, 
defined as the sum of shares owned by all foreign institutions that come from low-
innovation and low-governance countries, as a percentage of the firm’s total number of 
shares outstanding. 
 
3. Control Variables (Source: Worldscope) 
TA: Book value of total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year in millions. 
RD: Research and development expenditures scaled by total assets, measured at the end of the 
fiscal year, set to 0 if missing. 
FSALE: The percentage of foreign sales in total sales. 
INSIDE: Number of shares held by insiders as a proportion of the total number of shares 
outstanding.  
ln(SALE): Natural logarithm of net sales. 
ln(AGE): Natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm has its listed price. 
CAPEX: Capital expenditures divided by total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
PPE: Net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets, measured at the end of the 
fiscal year. 
LEV: Ratio of total debt to total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
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ROA: Return on assets, defined as operating income before depreciation divided by total 
assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
KZ: The KZ index measured at the end of fiscal year, calculated as −1.002 × Cash flow 
[(Income before extraordinary items + Depreciation and Amortization)/Lagged net 
property, plant, and equipment] + 0.283 × Q [Market value of equity + book value of 
total assets − book value of equity − balance sheet deferred tax] + 3.139 × 
Leverage[Total debt/Total assets] − 39.368 × Dividends [(Preferred dividends + 
Common dividends)/Lagged net property, plant, and equipment] − 3.315 × Cash 
holdings [(Cash and short-term investment)/(Lagged net property, plant, and 
equipment)]. 
TOBINS_Q: Growth opportunities, defined as market value of equity plus book value of assets 
minus book value of equity minus balance sheet deferred taxes, scaled by total assets, 
measured at the end of the fiscal year.  
HHI: Herfindahl index of 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry to which the 
firm belongs, measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
HHI2: Squared HHI. 
 
4. Country-Level Innovativeness and Control Variables (Source: World Bank, WDI, and 
other sources) 
PATENT_GDP: Total number of patent applications applied in a year by all residents of a 
country divided by GDP. 
PATENT_POP: Total number of patent applications applied in a year by all residents of a 
country divided by total population. 
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PATENT_FIRMS: Total number of patent applications applied in a year by all residents of a 
country divided by the number of listed firms. 
PATENT_MCAP: Total number of patent applications applied in a year by all residents of a 
country divided by market capitalization. 
P_INDEX: Patent protection index, developed by Ginarte and Park (1997), and updated by 
Park (2008). The index data are constructed for more than 100 countries, updated every 
5 years since 1960. The index takes values between 0 and 5. Higher values indicate 
patent laws with stronger intellectual property rights. The index coding scheme 
aggregates information on i) membership in international treaties (Paris Convention, 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, Budapest Treaty, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights), ii) enforcement mechanisms (preliminary injunctions, 
contributory infringement pleadings, burden of proof reversal), iii) restrictions on 
patent rights (working requirements, compulsory licensing, revocation of patents), iv) 
duration of protection, and v) extent of coverage (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food, 
surgical products, microorganisms, utility models, software, plant and animal 
varieties). 
RULE: The rule of law indicator of Kaufmann et al. (2011), which captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
GOODGOV: The government effectiveness indicator of Kaufmann et al. (2011), which 
captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
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and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies. 
EXPORT: The ratio of a country’s export to its GDP. 
IMPORT: The ratio of a country’s import to its GDP. 
EQUITY: The ratio of a country’s stock market capitalization to its GDP. 
CREDIT: The ratio of a country’s bank credit to its GDP. 
ln(GDP): The natural logarithm of real GDP per capita. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Firm Innovation and Institutional Ownership 
Table 1 reports the sample statistics for the 2000–2010 period. Panel A reports the means of 
innovation and institutional ownership sample data by country. Type of Markets reports if the 
economies are developed (DEV) or emerging (EMG) economies. No. of Firms is the number of 
firms in each sample country. No. of Firm-Years is the number of firm-year observations. 
PATENT is the total number of patent applications filed by each firm in each year. CITEPAT is 
the total number of citations received by each firm’s patents in each year. FIO and DIO are 
foreign institutional ownership and domestic institutional ownership, respectively. Panel B 
contains the summary statistics of firm- and country-level variables. Details of variable 
definitions are in Appendix B.  
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Panel A. Firm Innovation and Institutional Ownership by Country 
 
    Innovation  Institutional Ownership 
         
Country 
Type of 
Markets 
No. of 
Firms 
No. of 
Firm-Years  PATENT CITEPAT  FIO DIO 
          
Australia DEV 120 730 0.886 2.697   4.220 1.347 
Austria DEV 29 205 1.676 2.710   9.125 1.860 
Belgium DEV 23 173 11.327 27.638   11.038 3.310 
Brazil  EMG 46 313 1.324 2.782   7.972 0.373 
Canada DEV 246 1,579 1.954 4.272   9.589 13.996 
Denmark DEV 19 231 6.547 31.353   7.932 10.826 
Finland DEV 49 399 2.033 7.638   11.406 8.998 
France DEV 215 1,466 9.194 13.053   6.903 4.539 
Germany DEV 243 1,716 20.704 32.997   7.743 4.719 
Greece EMG 14 66 0.242 0.098   1.834 0.570 
Hong Kong DEV 13 101 0.426 0.391   7.399 1.205 
India EMG 183 1,080 3.422 12.637   3.713 3.114 
Israel EMG 62 343 1.708 4.123 18.997 1.029 
Italy DEV 66 461 3.059 4.542 7.566 2.605 
Japan DEV 1,309 11,209 25.451 40.599   2.747 2.369 
Korea EMG 591 3,173 18.452 33.157   3.479 0.107 
Netherlands DEV 20 160 14.721 21.250   18.668 4.631 
New Zealand DEV 12 74 1.027 0.930   1.155 0.524 
Norway DEV 47 267 2.404 4.506   8.722 10.223 
Singapore DEV 36 291 1.218 1.594   5.460 1.083 
South Africa EMG 16 120 0.267 0.193   8.429 4.197 
Spain DEV 23 191 0.803 0.508   6.796 4.687 
Sweden DEV 85 596 4.552 7.485   6.856 12.721 
Switzerland DEV 40 323 12.251 29.860   9.891 6.039 
Taiwan EMG 594 3,700 12.319 26.095   2.306 0.287 
United Kingdom DEV 148 1,041 2.772 6.727   4.596 19.056 
         
Developed  DEV 2,743 21,213 16.841 27.514   5.052 5.036 
Emerging  EMG 1,506 8,795 12.379 24.755   3.834 0.656 
All economies ALL 4,249 30,008 15.533 26.705   4.695 3.753 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B. Summary Statistics 
 
Variables No. of Firms No. of Firm-Years Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
       
Innovation Variables             
PATENT 4,249 30,008 15.533 61.319 0.000 0.000 3.000 
CITEPAT 4,249 30,008 26.705 106.483 0.000 0.000 3.460 
ln(PATENT) 4,249 30,008 0.904 1.427 0.000 0.000 1.386 
ln(CITEPAT) 4,249 30,008 0.957 1.670 0.000 0.000 1.495 
       
Ownership Variables             
FIO 4,249 30,008 4.695 8.779 0.000 0.937 5.585 
FIOUS 4,249 30,008 2.380 6.245 0.000 0.269 1.949 
FIONONUS 4,249 30,008 2.316 4.418 0.000 0.247 2.840 
FIOLONG_TERM 4,249 30,008 4.561 8.583 0.000 0.835 5.388 
FIOSHORT_TERM 4,249 30,008 0.135 0.850 0.000 0.000 0.028 
FIOINDEPENDENT 4,249 30,008 4.443 8.456 0.000 0.852 5.203 
FIOGREY 4,249 30,008 0.252 0.657 0.000 0.000 0.153 
FIOHIGH_PATENT GDP 4,249 30,008 3.980 7.971 0.000 0.674 4.458 
FIOLOW_PATENT GDP 4,249 30,008 0.715 1.681 0.000 0.000 0.636 
FIOHIGH_PATENT POP 4,249 30,008 4.403 8.442 0.000 0.826 5.128 
FIOLOW_PATENT POP 4,249 30,008 0.292 0.952 0.000 0.000 0.080 
FIOHIGH_PATENT FIRMS 4,249 30,008 4.166 8.225 0.000 0.711 4.711 
FIOLOW_PATENT FIRMS 4,249 30,008 0.530 1.514 0.000 0.000 0.300 
FIOHIGH_PATENT MCAP 4,249 30,008 2.710 6.519 0.000 0.341 2.447 
FIOLOW_PATENT MCAP 4,249 30,008 1.985 3.881 0.000 0.182 2.418 
DIO 4,249 30,008 3.753 7.254 0.000 0.577 4.347 
 
Control Variables 
ln(TA) 4,249 30,008 5.755 1.984 4.393 5.555 6.968 
AGE 4,249 30,008 14.528 10.634 6.000 12.000 20.000 
ln(SALE) 4,249 30,008 5.587 2.172 4.257 5.518 6.963 
FSALE 4,249 30,008 0.212 0.355 0.000 0.000 0.373 
INSIDE 4,249 30,008 0.273 0.260 0.000 0.244 0.467 
HHI 4,249 30,008 0.252 0.259 0.072 0.145 0.338 
HHI2 4,249 30,008 0.130 0.246 0.005 0.021 0.114 
RD 4,249 30,008 0.032 0.067 0.000 0.008 0.033 
CAPEX 4,249 30,008 0.055 0.052 0.019 0.040 0.072 
PPE 4,249 30,008 0.286 0.181 0.142 0.271 0.405 
LEV 4,249 30,008 0.213 0.180 0.053 0.190 0.328 
ROA 4,249 30,008 0.074 0.119 0.044 0.089 0.137 
TOBINS_Q 4,249 30,008 1.570 1.392 0.922 1.151 1.636 
KZ 4,249 30,008 -7.351 23.848 -4.828 -1.069 0.647 
P_INDEX 4,249 30,008 4.370 0.451 4.170 4.670 4.670 
GOODGOV 4,249 30,008 1.338 0.470 1.120 1.420 1.620 
RULE 4,249 30,008 1.227 0.438 0.970 1.290 1.550 
EXPORT 4,249 30,008 0.324 0.265 0.143 0.263 0.421 
IMPORT 4,249 30,008 0.300 0.238 0.129 0.278 0.371 
EQUITY 4,249 30,008 0.896 0.446 0.613 0.790 1.085 
CREDIT 4,249 30,008 1.372 1.368 0.000 1.255 3.020 
ln(GDP) 4,249 30,008 10.207 0.502 10.248 10.320 10.376 
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TABLE 2  
Baseline Regressions 
Table 2 reports the regressions of firm innovation on institutional ownership. Columns 1–2 (3–4) 
show the pooled OLS (firm-fixed effects) regression results. The dependent variable is shown as 
column heading in columns 1–4. The main independent variable is foreign institutional 
ownership (FIO). All explanatory variables are lagged by 1 year. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported below in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 2 (continued)  
      
 ln(PATENT) ln(CITEPAT)  ln(PATENT) ln(CITEPAT) 
      
Variables 1 2  3 4 
      
FIO 0.010*** 0.014***  0.008*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) DIO -0.010*** -0.012***  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.002) INSIDE -0.072 -0.054  0.062* 0.084* 
 (0.063) (0.070)  (0.032) (0.044) ln(AGE) 0.062** 0.062*  0.086** 0.118** 
 (0.029) (0.032)  (0.037) (0.049) HHI 0.396 0.400  -0.170 0.152 
  (0.292) (0.326)  (0.274) (0.347) 
HHI2 -0.277 -0.280  0.152 0.050 
  (0.277) (0.307)  (0.241) (0.290) 
RD 2.267*** 2.637***  0.054 -0.232 
 (0.238) (0.288)  (0.132) (0.215) CAPEX 2.313*** 2.913***  0.378*** 0.519*** 
  (0.269) (0.308)  (0.134) (0.184) 
PPE -0.232** -0.192  -0.082 -0.095 
  (0.116) (0.129)  (0.086) (0.114) 
LEV -0.365*** -0.453***  -0.132** -0.185*** 
  (0.097) (0.104)  (0.057) (0.070) 
ROA -0.616*** -0.850***  -0.037 -0.169 
  (0.144) (0.165)  (0.079) (0.108) 
FSALE 0.138** 0.169*  0.000 -0.009 
(0.067) (0.088)  (0.020) (0.018) 
ln(SALE) 0.276*** 0.317***  0.110*** 0.115*** 
 (0.016) (0.018)  (0.015) (0.020) 
TOBINS_Q 0.071*** 0.099***  0.005 0.001 
  (0.011) (0.014)  (0.005) (0.008) 
KZ -0.002*** -0.003***  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
P INDEX 0.115** 0.186***  0.116*** 0.150** 
 (0.047) (0.064)  (0.045) (0.062) RULE 0.098 0.051  -0.033 -0.081 
 (0.080) (0.100)  (0.071) (0.093) GOODGOV 0.128** 0.116*  0.131*** 0.131** 
 (0.053) (0.066)  (0.049) (0.062) EXPORT 0.283 0.096  -0.027 -0.117 
  (0.409) (0.498)  (0.383) (0.465) 
IMPORT 0.886** 0.555  0.793* 0.483 
 (0.440) (0.549)  (0.406) (0.517) EQUITY 0.078** 0.012  0.089*** 0.067* 
  (0.031) (0.039)  (0.028) (0.036) 
CREDIT -0.017 -0.048***  0.014 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.017)  (0.011) (0.015) ln(GDP) 0.233*** 0.155*  0.151** 0.105 
 (0.073) (0.090)  (0.066) (0.086) Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  No No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes  No No 
Adj. R2 0.246 0.238  0.851 0.766 
No. of obs. 30,008 30,008  30,008 30,008 
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TABLE 3  
Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
Table 3 reports the diagnostics and results of the difference-in-differences (DID) tests on how a 
plausibly exogenous shock to foreign institutional ownership due to the passage of the JGTRRA 
in 2003 affects firm innovation. Treatment firms must pay dividends in the pretax cut year 
(2002) and be domiciled in treaty countries. Control firms must be domiciled in non-treaty 
countries and pay dividends in the pretax cut year (2002). Each control firm is then matched to 5 
treatment firms using the nearest neighbor propensity score matching procedure, on a vector of 
firm- and country-level characteristics as in the baseline regression, and innovation growth 
variables (GROWTHPATENT and GROWTHCITATION) over 3 years before the tax cut. Panel A 
reports the univariate comparison between innovation growth variables of treatment firms and 
those of control firms, and their corresponding t-statistics. Panel B reports the univariate DID 
estimators with standard errors displayed below in parentheses. Panel C reports the multivariate 
DID test results with standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering displayed below in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Differences in Innovation Growth Variables 
Variables Treatment Control Differences t-Statistics 
     
GROWTHPATENT 0.468 0.391 0.077 1.56 
GROWTHCITATION 0.363 0.301 0.062 1.15 
     
Panel B. Difference-in-Differences Test 
 
Treatment 
After − Before 
Control 
After − Before 
Treatment − Control 
DID Estimator t-Statistics for DID 
     
Variables 1 2 3 4 
     
ln(PATENT)  0.178 0.079 0.099** 2.215 
 (0.047) (0.035)     
ln(CITEPAT) 0.205 0.082 0.123*** 2.849 
 (0.054) (0.033)     
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TABLE 3 (continued)  
 
Panel C. Multivariate Difference-in-Differences Test 
 
 FIOUS  ln(PATENT)  ln(CITEPAT)          
Variables 1 2  3 4  5 6 
         TREAT×POST 1.501*** 1.089***  0.109*** 0.091***  0.121*** 0.115*** 
 (0.076) (0.079)  (0.020) (0.022)  (0.029) (0.033) FIONONUS  0.091***   0.017**   0.021*    (0.022)   (0.007)   (0.011) DIO  0.018**   -0.002   -0.009 
  (0.009)   (0.005)   (0.008) INSIDE  0.194   0.094   0.077 
  (0.181)   (0.092)   (0.123) ln(AGE)  -0.058   0.338***   0.243** 
  (0.152)   (0.071)   (0.108) HHI  1.250   1.013*   0.753    (1.286)   (0.586)   (0.883) HHI2  -1.229   -0.751   -0.591    (1.240)   (0.512)   (0.837) RD  -0.648   0.621   0.002 
  (1.527)   (0.851)   (1.164) CAPEX  0.487   0.261   0.135    (0.673)   (0.303)   (0.483) PPE  0.915*   0.280   0.090   (0.469)  (0.195)  (0.301) 
LEV 0.077  -0.240  -0.277 
  (0.362)  (0.174)  (0.254) 
ROA  -0.695   -0.767***   -0.504    (0.578)   (0.292)   (0.393) FSALE  -0.161   0.098   -0.139 
  (0.247)   (0.101)   (0.166) ln(SALE)  0.578***   0.111***   0.137*** 
  (0.113)   (0.037)   (0.042) 
TOBINS_Q  0.055   -0.040**   -0.066**    (0.038)   (0.018)   (0.029) KZ  0.003   -0.002*   -0.002* 
  (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
P_INDEX  0.049   0.246***   0.386*** 
  (0.187)   (0.071)   (0.136) RULE  -0.392   -0.212   0.031 
  (0.323)   (0.137)   (0.197) GOODGOV  0.884***   0.144   0.159 
  (0.267)   (0.107)   (0.165) EXPORT  6.209***   0.143   -2.502**    (2.032)   (0.738)   (1.072) IMPORT   -6.101***   -0.454   3.039** 
  (2.213)   (0.916)   (1.355) EQUITY  0.162   0.194**   0.350***    (0.218)   (0.086)   (0.136) CREDIT  0.114   -0.016   -0.024 
  (0.071)   (0.032)   (0.045) ln(GDP)  0.570   0.293*   0.002 
  (0.360)   (0.153)   (0.246) Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.821 0.839  0.844 0.867  0.800 0.826 
No. of obs. 4,788 4,788  4,788 4,788  4,788 4,788 
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TABLE 4 
Instrumental Variable Approach 
Table 4 presents the 2-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions of firm innovation on foreign 
institutional ownership. The instrumental variable for foreign institutional ownership (MSCI) is 
the time-varying membership of the MSCI All Country World Index. All explanatory variables 
are lagged by 1 year and defined as in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
and reported below in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
        
 1SLS  2SLS  1SLS  2SLS 
        
 FIO  ln(PATENT) ln(CITEPAT)  FIO  ln(PATENT) ln(CITEPAT) 
          
Variables 1  2 3  4  5 6 
          
MSCI 4.331***     2.141***    
  (0.314)     (0.130)    
FIOPREDICTED   0.076*** 0.084***    0.037*** 0.046*** 
    (0.022) (0.024)    (0.009) (0.013) 
DIO 0.107***  -0.019*** -0.025***  0.016***  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.023)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.001) (0.002) 
INSIDE -4.275***  0.570*** 0.667***  -2.125***  0.096** 0.159*** 
 (0.354)  (0.127) (0.142)  (0.188)  (0.047) (0.057) 
ln(AGE) -0.452***  0.097*** 0.102**  -0.709***  0.110*** 0.135*** 
 (0.149)  (0.036) (0.040)  (0.165)  (0.023) (0.033) 
HHI 0.099  0.270 0.258  2.112*  -0.258 0.084 
  (1.438)  (0.350) (0.391)  (1.157)  (0.162) (0.229) 
HHI2 0.198  -0.257 -0.257  -1.588  0.213 0.097 
  (1.479)  (0.334) (0.372)  (1.023)  (0.143) (0.202) 
RD 3.233*  1.819*** 2.137***  -2.139**  0.149 -0.160 
 (1.927)  (0.353) (0.403)  (0.873)  (0.123) (0.174) 
CAPEX 3.861***  1.708*** 2.238***  2.414***  0.274** 0.443*** 
  (1.408)  (0.345) (0.390)  (0.739)  (0.105) (0.149) 
PPE 0.781  -0.332** -0.304*  0.353  -0.090 -0.101 
  (0.710)  (0.151) (0.168)  (0.454)  (0.063) (0.089) 
LEV -4.076***  -0.191 -0.170  -2.264***  -0.033 -0.110* 
  (0.495)  (0.150) (0.164)  (0.185)  (0.047) (0.067) 
ROA 0.438  -0.467** -0.683***  -1.180**  0.016 -0.129 
  (0.904)  (0.181) (0.206)  (0.475)  (0.067) (0.095) 
FSALE 2.674**  -0.223* -0.236*  0.193*  -0.009 -0.016 
 (1.047)  (0.118) (0.121)  (0.115)  (0.016) (0.023) 
ln(SALE) 1.402***  0.037*** 0.049***  1.318***  0.050*** 0.070*** 
 (0.092)  (0.012) (0.016)  (0.044)  (0.016) (0.023) 
TOBINS_Q 0.576***  0.022 0.005  0.211***  0.007 0.009 
  (0.078)  (0.021) (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.005) (0.007) 
KZ -0.009***  -0.002** -0.002*  -0.005***  -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (0.004)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
P_INDEX 0.378  0.160** 0.237***  0.291**  0.121*** 0.156*** 
 (0.329)  (0.063) (0.079)  (0.136)  (0.031) (0.044) 
RULE 0.492  0.026 0.029  -0.083  -0.015 -0.068 
 (0.660)  (0.118) (0.139)  (0.241)  (0.055) (0.078) 
GOODGOV -2.315***  0.431*** 0.456***  -0.306*  0.194*** 0.182*** 
 (0.471)  (0.096) (0.111)  (0.161)  (0.039) (0.055) 
EXPORT 7.363*  -0.732 -1.038  5.806***  -0.504 -0.489 
  (4.132)  (0.710) (0.820)  (1.244)  (0.391) (0.425) 
IMPORT -8.516**  2.047*** 1.854**  -6.556***  1.419*** 0.972** 
 (4.206)  (0.732) (0.853)  (1.403)  (0.345) (0.488) 
EQUITY -0.281  0.115** 0.053  -0.138  0.098*** 0.074** 
  (0.370)  (0.058) (0.068)  (0.172)  (0.024) (0.034) 
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CREDIT -0.308***  0.019 -0.007  -0.390***  0.031*** 0.008 
 (0.098)  (0.020) (0.023)  (0.074)  (0.011) (0.015) 
ln(GDP) 1.091**  0.128 0.036  0.892**  0.105** 0.117* 
 (0.530)  (0.101) (0.122)  (0.305)  (0.043) (0.060) 
Year fixed effects        Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects        No  No No  Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes Yes  No  No No 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes Yes  No  No No 
F-test (p-value) < 0.001     < 0.001    
R2 0.391  0.213 0.155  0.138  0.065 0.053 
No. of obs. 30,008  30,008 30,008  30,008  30,008 30,008 
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TABLE 5 
Economic Mechanisms: Monitoring 
Table 5 presents the tests on how the monitoring channel explains the effect of foreign 
institutional ownership on firm innovation. Panel A presents the regressions with firm fixed 
effects. Foreign institutional ownership is classified into independent and grey foreign 
institutional ownership (models 1 and 3), or into long-term and short-term foreign institutional 
ownership (models 2 and 4). All explanatory variables are lagged by 1 year and defined as in 
Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported below in parentheses. 
Panel B reports the DID estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.   
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TABLE 5 (continued)  
 
Panel A. Firm Fixed Effects 
 
 ln(PATENT)  ln(CITEPAT) 
    
  X=INDEPENDENT X=LONG_TERM  X=INDEPENDENT X=LONG_TERM 
      
Variables 1 2  3 4 
      
FIOX 0.008** 0.008***  0.011*** 0.011*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) 
FIOEXCLUDING_X -0.004 0.005  0.002 0.000 
  (0.012) (0.004)  (0.015) (0.008) 
DIO -0.001 -0.001  -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) INSIDE 0.062* 0.062*  0.084* 0.084* 
 (0.032) (0.032)  (0.044) (0.044) ln(AGE) 0.085** 0.087**  0.117** 0.118** 
 (0.037) (0.037)  (0.048) (0.049) HHI -0.168 -0.171  0.153 0.152 
  (0.274) (0.274)  (0.347) (0.347) 
HHI2 0.150 0.152  0.048 0.049 
  (0.241) (0.241)  (0.290) (0.290) 
RD 0.054 0.056  -0.231 -0.233 
(0.132) (0.132)  (0.215) (0.215) 
CAPEX 0.379*** 0.375***  0.519*** 0.519*** 
  (0.134) (0.134)  (0.184) (0.184) 
PPE -0.082 -0.083  -0.095 -0.096 
  (0.086) (0.086)  (0.114) (0.114) 
LEV -0.134** -0.131**  -0.185*** -0.185*** 
  (0.057) (0.057)  (0.070) (0.071) 
ROA -0.038 -0.035  -0.170 -0.168 
  (0.079) (0.079)  (0.109) (0.109) 
FSALE 0.000 0.000  -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.020) (0.020)  (0.018) (0.018) ln(SALE) 0.111*** 0.109***  0.115*** 0.115*** 
 (0.015) (0.015)  (0.020) (0.020) TOBINS_Q 0.005 0.005  0.001 0.001 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.008) 
KZ -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
P_INDEX 0.116*** 0.116***  0.150** 0.150** 
 (0.045) (0.045)  (0.062) (0.062) RULE -0.032 -0.033  -0.081 -0.081 
 (0.071) (0.071)  (0.093) (0.093) GOODGOV 0.130*** 0.132***  0.131** 0.131** 
 (0.049) (0.049)  (0.062) (0.062) EXPORT -0.019 -0.030  -0.119 -0.118 
  (0.382) (0.383)  (0.464) (0.465) 
IMPORT 0.786* 0.794*  0.485 0.482 
 (0.405) (0.406)  (0.517) (0.517) EQUITY 0.089*** 0.089***  0.067* 0.067* 
  (0.028) (0.028)  (0.036) (0.036) 
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CREDIT 0.014 0.014  -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.011)  (0.015) (0.015) ln(GDP) 0.150** 0.152**  0.103 0.104 
 (0.066) (0.066)  (0.086) (0.086) Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.872 0.872  0.799 0.799 
No. of obs. 30,008 30,008  30,008 30,008 
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TABLE 5 (continued)  
 
Panel B. Difference-in-Differences Test 
 
  
Treatment  
Group  
After − Before 
Control 
 Group  
After − Before 
Treatment − Control  
DID Estimator 
t-Statistics for  
DID Estimator 
     
Variables 1 2 3 4 
    
Independent Institutions       
ln(PATENT)  0.175 0.079 0.096*** 2.567 
  (0.039) (0.035)     
ln(CITEPAT) 0.202 0.082 0.120** 2.165 
  (0.050) (0.033)     
     
Grey Institutions         
ln(PATENT) 0.160 0.079 0.081 1.610 
  (0.045) (0.035)     
ln(CITEPAT) 0.161 0.082 0.079* 1.733 
  (0.085) (0.033)     
    
Long-Term Institutions       
ln(PATENT)  0.204 0.079 0.125*** 3.149 
  (0.044) (0.035)     
ln(CITEPAT) 0.233 0.082 0.151*** 3.246 
  (0.041) (0.033)     
    
Short-Term Institutions       
ln(PATENT)  0.154 0.079 0.075 1.451 
  (0.075) (0.035)     
ln(CITEPAT) 0.165 0.082 0.083 1.521 
  (0.084) (0.033)     
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TABLE 6  
Economic Mechanisms: Insurance 
Table 6 presents the tests on how the insurance channel explains the effect of foreign 
institutional ownership on firm innovation. Panel A reports the regression results with firm fixed 
effects. In model 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable (CEO_TURN), which equals 1 if 
the CEO at the end of the fiscal year is different from the CEO at the end of the previous fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise. The main independent variable is the interaction between the change in 
profitability and foreign institutional ownership (FIO×∆ROA). Models 2 and 3 show the results 
of regressions of the change in the managers’ compensation on foreign institutional ownership, 
where the dependent variables are measured by the change in cash and bonus compensation 
(model 2) and the change in total compensation (model 3). The main independent variable is the 
interaction between the change in shareholders’ wealth and foreign institutional ownership 
(FIO×∆WEALTH). Panel B report the DID test results. All explanatory are lagged by 1 year. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix B. Standard errors clustered at the firm level (Panel A) and 
bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level (Panel B) are reported below in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
 
    
 CEO_TURN ∆CEO_CASH ∆CEO_TOTAL 
    
Variables 1 2 3 
    
Panel A. Firm Fixed Effects    
    
FIO×∆ROA 0.001**   
 (0.000)   
DIO×∆ROA 0.000   
 (0.000)   
∆ROA -0.011**     
  (0.005)     
FIO×∆WEALTH   -0.018** -0.027** 
    (0.007) (0.012) 
DIO×∆WEALTH   0.002 0.003 
    (0.005) (0.009) 
∆WEALTH   0.382** 0.458*** 
    (0.175) (0.176) 
FIO 0.000 15.065* 26.776 
  (0.006) (9.011) (33.620) 
DIO 0.001 -3.018 -24.286 
  (0.004) (5.688) (19.870) 
ln(MCAP) 0.017 -0.007 0.047 
  (0.036) (0.083) (0.083) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.125 0.227 0.122 
No. of obs. 755 785 785 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B. Difference-in-Differences Test 
     
∆ROA×TREAT×POST 0.005***      
  (0.002)      
∆ROA×TREAT  -0.004**      
  (0.002)      
∆ROA×POST -0.003***      
  (0.001)      
∆ROA -0.006**      
   (0.003)      
∆WEALTH×TREAT×POST   -0.015* -0.023*** 
   (0.008)  (0.007) 
∆WEALTH×TREAT  -0.007 -0.026 
     (0.010)  (0.017) 
∆WEALTH×POST  -0.039 -0.012** 
  (0.085)  (0.006) 
∆WEALTH    0.455* 0.716*** 
      (0.263) (0.226) 
TREAT×POST 0.028 16.786 -24.132 
   (0.112) (13.156) (15.643) 
ln(MCAP) 0.011* 0.074 0.017* 
  (0.006) (0.042) (0.009) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.096 0.042 0.078 
No. of obs. 110 121 121 
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TABLE 7 
Economic Mechanisms: Knowledge Spillovers 
Table 7 reports the tests on how the knowledge spillovers channel explains the effect of foreign 
institutional ownership on firm innovation. A country-level measure of innovativeness is 
constructed based on 4 ratios: the total number of patents applied by all residents of a country in 
a year scaled by i) GDP (PATENT_GDP), ii) total population (PATENT_POP), iii) total number 
of listed firms (PATENT_FIRMS), and iv) country market capitalization (PATENT_MCAP) 
measured in that year. A country-level measure of governance is based on the anti-self-dealing 
index of La Porta et al. (2006). An institution’s home country is a high- or low-innovation 
(governance) country if its measure of innovativeness (governance) is above or below the 
median of all domiciled countries of sample institutional investors. In Panel A, foreign 
institutional ownership is classified into ownership from high-innovation countries 
(FIOHIGH_INNO) and ownership from low-innovation countries (FIOLOW_INNO). In Panel B, foreign 
institutional ownership is classified into ownership from high-innovation and high-governance 
countries (FIOHIGHINNO_HIGHGOV), high-innovation and low-governance countries 
(FIOHIGHINNO_LOWGOV), low-innovation and high-governance countries (FIOLOWINNO_HIGHGOV), 
low-innovation and low-governance countries (FIOLOWINNO_LOWGOV). All explanatory variables 
are lagged by 1 year. Variable definitions are in Appendix B. Standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are reported below in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
 ln(PATENT)  ln(CITEPAT) 
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Variables 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 
          
Panel A. Foreign Institutional Ownership Classified By Foreign Institutions’ Home-Country Innovativeness 
          
FIOHIGH_INNO 0.007* 0.009*** 0.009** 0.011  0.011** 0.012*** 0.013** 0.020** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) 
FIOLOW_INNOV 0.014 0.001 0.014 0.006  0.018 0.015 0.015 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.025) (0.012) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.033) (0.015) (0.005) 
DIO -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
INSIDE 0.062* 0.061* 0.061* 0.062*  0.086* 0.084* 0.085* 0.086* 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
ln(AGE) 0.087** 0.087** 0.086** 0.087**  0.119** 0.118** 0.118** 0.120** 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
HHI -0.169 -0.171 -0.169 -0.171  0.152 0.151 0.152 0.151 
  (0.274) (0.274) (0.274) (0.274)  (0.346) (0.347) (0.347) (0.347) 
HHI2 0.149 0.151 0.150 0.151  0.046 0.049 0.048 0.048 
  (0.241) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241)  (0.290) (0.290) (0.290) (0.291) 
RD 0.053 0.055 0.055 0.054  -0.233 -0.231 -0.230 -0.231 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132)  (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) 
CAPEX 0.378*** 0.378*** 0.377*** 0.378***  0.517*** 0.519*** 0.518*** 0.518*** 
  (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134)  (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) 
PPE -0.080 -0.083 -0.082 -0.081  -0.093 -0.095 -0.095 -0.093 
  (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)  (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
LEV -0.133** -0.133** -0.132** -0.134**  -0.184*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** 
  (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)  (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
ROA -0.039 -0.037 -0.039 -0.040  -0.170 -0.170 -0.170 -0.171 
  (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)  (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
FSALE 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000  -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
ln(SALE) 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110***  0.114*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
TOBINS_Q 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
KZ -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
P_INDEX 0.114** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.115***  0.148** 0.151** 0.150** 0.150** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)  (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) 
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RULE -0.033 -0.031 -0.031 -0.033  -0.081 -0.080 -0.078 -0.081 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)  (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
GOODGOV 0.134*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.133***  0.133** 0.130** 0.129** 0.131** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)  (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
EXPORT -0.043 -0.029 -0.042 -0.039  -0.142 -0.123 -0.137 -0.136 
  (0.383) (0.383) (0.384) (0.383)  (0.464) (0.465) (0.465) (0.465) 
IMPORT 0.803** 0.792* 0.803** 0.802**  0.501 0.486 0.497 0.500 
 (0.406) (0.406) (0.406) (0.406)  (0.517) (0.517) (0.518) (0.518) 
EQUITY 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.090***  0.069* 0.067* 0.068* 0.068* 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)  (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
CREDIT 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014  -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
ln(GDP) 0.149** 0.152** 0.150** 0.150**  0.102 0.104 0.104 0.105 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)  (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872  0.799 0.799 0.799 0.799 
No. of obs. 30,008 30,008 30,008 30,008  30,008 30,008 30,008 30,008 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
 Panel B. Foreign Institutional Ownership Classified By Foreign Institutions’ Home-Country Innovativeness and 
Governance 
          
FIOHIGHINNO_HIGHGOV 0.009*** 0.007* 0.010** 0.013*  0.011** 0.009* 0.012** 0.018* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) 
FIOHIGHINNO_LOWGOV 0.004** 0.003* 0.005*** 0.004  0.004** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
FIOLOWINNO_HIGHGOV 0.013 0.019 0.011* 0.005*  0.019 0.035 0.011** 0.005* 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003)  (0.012) (0.025) (0.005) (0.003) 
FIOLOWINNO_LOWGOV 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.001  0.008 0.006 0.004 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.005) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872  0.799 0.799 0.799 0.799 
No. of obs. 30,008 30,008 30,008 30,008  30,008 30,008 30,008 30,008 
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FIGURE 1 
Innovation Output of Treatment and Control Firms Surrounding the Passage of the 
JGTRRA in 2003 
Figure 1 shows the average innovation output of the treatment and control firms from 3 years 
before to 3 years after the passage of the JGTRRA in 2003. The event year is denoted as year 0 
(2003). The sample contains 456 unique treatment firms and 228 unique control firms. Graph A 
reports the mean logarithm of the total number of patents (ln(PATENT)) and Graph B reports the 
mean natural logarithm of the total number of citations per patent (ln(CITEPAT)).  
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FIGURE 1 (continued) 
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